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Migration in an age of globalization is one of the most important points of 
contention on the international stage. It challenges the boundaries of the 
nation state and demands answers that have not yet been given. In this work, 
we will analyse the migration flow from Brazil to Portugal, studying in 
particular the years between 2003 and 2013. What is the role of the state? 
What can the state do and what should it? From a liberal thesis perspective, 
we will analyse three variables: push-pull factors, networks, and rights. It will 
be employ an encompassing approach towards market demands, the 
importance of migrants themselves in perpetuating migration, and the role of 
the state on migration policies. This theorization has not yet been applied to 
Portugal, and it is quite fortuitous to explain the consolidation of rights-based 
constitutionalism as the state’s liberal answer to migration. We will address 
the bilateral agreements between both countries, Estatuto da Igualdade and 
Acordo Lula more specifically, and the legislative changes in nationality law 
and immigration law in Portugal. Only by equally analysing these variables 
can we bring the state back in to the discussion about market demand and 
migrants networks, and that is our goal.  
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If I am Syrian, what wonder? Stranger, we dwell in one country, the world: 
one Chaos gave birth to all mortals. 
Meleager of Gadara, 100 b.C. 
 
Nomads, sailors, merchants and travellers have been immortalized as 
characters in epic tales of migration. Women and men crossing all areas of 
the globe looking for food, safety, and wealth. This was once a less important 
political debate, but this is no longer the case. The modern state was born 
through wars that guaranteed a bounded territory and people. The passport 
was invented, visas were required, and migrants were seen as a strange 
element in a system of nation states. Not only courage was needed, but also 
some extent of subversion, when leaving one’s country and exploring a 
foreign land. 
The right to leave a country was only codified in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, where Article 13 claims that ‘everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to his country’. This post-war 
concern has been fulfilled by democracies that deal with the problem to the 
extent of their borders. But which right allows migrants to enter another 
country? This has not yet been solved and is one of the reasons why 
migration is a sensitive topic for international relations today.  
Scholars have been trying to theorize migration from different standpoints: 
reasons why individuals leave their country or not, reasons why individuals 
choose specific countries as a destination, reasons why the labour market 
demands foreign workers and why states have not been able to conciliate all 
these reasons in their quest to control migration. Answering these questions 
has not become easier over time, rather they have become a part of an even 
more complex and intricate globalized world. 
The 21st century holds together some dissonant features within its 
contemporary international politics. There is a contrast between the cultural 
specificity of our current international order and the cultural diversity in the 
world that also helps us to understand the origins of this question. Our world 
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today has nearly 200 members of the United Nations, and the 21st century is 
struggling to accommodate peoples from different religions and a whole wide 
range of cultural backgrounds. Globalization has questioned the notion of the 
relative autonomy of the nation-state, breaking the territorial nexus between 
power and place, and undermined the ideology of distinct and relatively 
autonomous national cultures through the process of homogenization. Hence, 
Globalization has led to a rapid increase in the mobility of people across 
borders.  
Conversely, there are novelties about current migrations, two of which have 
been highlighted by Castles and Davidson in their work Citizenship and 
Migration, Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (2000: 9). First, its scale 
throughout the globe, changing migration patterns and flows. Second, the 
ethnocultural diversity of most migrants, from distant areas and also distant 
cultures. They challenge the old concept of a state based on nationalities and 
need new forms of accommodation in political, social, and economical terms. 
This deviant character of migration is not only related to a fundamental 
tension between the interests of individuals and society, but also involves a 
tension in the same sense between sending and receiving countries, each of 
which regulates migration in accordance to its own goals (Zolberg 1981: 20).  
In our work, we will focus on the changes reverberated upon Brazil and 
Portugal that changed their migration patterns. Portugal, who was far more 
used to be an emigration country, becomes one of the latecomers to 
migration, when in the 1970s and 1980s Portugal became as well a country of 
immigration. Brazil, on the other hand, who had received immigrants from its 
‘discovery’ until the end of the Second World War, was faced with a new 
reality of emigration during the same period. Thus, this time Brazilians were 
the ones crossing the Atlantic frontier towards the Iberian country.  
During the last two decades of the 20th century, Brazil was facing tremendous 
social and economic crises and Portugal was successfully entering a new 
phase of European integration. The likely migration system became a reality 
and the first wave of Brazilian migrants was of high skilled workers who were 
looking for better opportunities in a country where language and cultural 
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barriers were lower. Since the nineties, a cost-reducing network was able to 
reinforce this flow, but with a bigger diversification of migrants. Construction 
workers, waiters and waitresses, service workers and a full range of less 
qualified workers. This second wave of migration (Casa do Brasil, 2004) 
posed new challenges including the increase of irregular migration.  
During this second wave of migration, an interesting treaty was signed 
between both countries. In 2000, in celebration of the 500th anniversary of the 
Brazilian ‘discovery’, the ‘Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Consulta entre 
a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Portuguesa’ was signed. It 
allowed both Portuguese and Brazilian nationals to enjoy a broader set of 
rights when living abroad, altering the relationship between citizenship and 
nationality. This treaty guarantees equality between some social and political 
rights for Portuguese and Brazilians. Yet, it did not solve the matter of 
irregular migration between both countries and shortly after it was addressed 
with another agreement. There were six extraordinary periods of 
regularization in Portuguese history, but there is one particularity about the 
regulation process that took place between 2003/4: it was the consequence of 
another bilateral agreement between Portugal and Brazil. The ‘Acordo Brasil-
Portugal Sobre a Contratação Recíproca de Nacionais’ well known as ‘Acordo 
Lula’, was another proof of a sort of positive discrimination towards these 
migrants. As our hypothesis holds, it was not a coincidence that, according to 
Serviço de Estangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) Report in 2007, Brazilians 
surpassed the amount of Cape Verdeans to become the most important 
sending country with 15% of the migration population. 
Mainly motivated by economic factors of attraction, they chose Portugal and 
opened a channel of contact between both countries. Through networks that 
tie potential migrants to those who have already crossed the ocean, a self-
perpetuating migratory flow was in place. As a consequence, in 2007, Brazil 
was the main sending country to Portugal, which remains true today. Yet we 
cannot neglect the role of both states in this developing migration flow, and 
that is why we have chosen the liberal state thesis to base our analysis.  
The liberal state thesis portrays international migration as a function of (1) 
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economic forces (demand-pull and supply-push factors), (2) networks, and (3) 
rights. In doing so, it gathers a lot of theoretical insights from economics, 
sociology and law. James Hollifield argues in his work Immigrants, Markets 
and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe that rights must be 
incorporated as an institutional, legal and notional variable. Bearing this in 
mind, this work has a much more humble objective: to analyse the role of 
Brazil and Portugal in the shaping of its migration system flow. More 
specifically, it will focus on the migration flow from Brazil to Portugal and the 
impact of the ‘Estatuto de Igualdade’ and ‘Acordo Brasil-Portugal Sobre 
Contratação Recíproca de Nacionals’ (Acordo Lula). But the main question is: 
what is the role of the State in a contemporary democracy into shaping 
migration flows? The concrete example of Brazil will show how in fact this role 
is important in contemporary politics. 
To do so, we will divide the work into three chapters. The first one deals with 
the theoretical framework and the ongoing debate on migration, from older 
and established debates on economics and sociology to the new theorizations 
from political scientists. At present, there is no single theory accepted by 
social scientists for the explanation of international migration, but only a series 
of fragmented sets of theories within different disciplinary frameworks. Only 
with an encompassing overview of this dialogue can we move further into our 
analysis, since there is no consensus but rather multiple answers that may be 
more adequate in some scenarios than others. The second contextualizes the 
aforementioned transitions experienced by both countries, and how they 
culminated in bilateral agreements between both states: Tratado da Amizade, 
Estatuto da Igualdade and Acordo Lula. We have decided to analyze the 
bilateral agreements separately from other legislative changes, discussed in 
chapter three, because although they conferred special status to Brazilian 
migrants it does not change legal requirements needed to be a regular 
migrant and acquiring citizenship. Our final chapter uses the liberal state 
thesis’ levels of analysis in its three variables: push-pull factors, networks, and 
rights.  
Our main thesis is that the rights-based constitutionalism which emerged in 
the nineties was the novelty in this decade, turning Portugal into a much 
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more attractive country for migrants even in moments of crisis. While push-
pull factors triggered migration in the first wave of Brazilians towards Portugal, 
the resulting establishment of networks functioned to assist migrants in the 
second wave. But it was only with the liberalization which started in the 
nineties and was consolidated in the legislative changes occurred in 2006 and 
2007 that rights became an important decision factor for migrants willing to 
settle in the country.  
Accordingly, a real democratic state conceived as a plural arena safeguarded 
by the rule of law, human rights, political participation, consensus building and 




Chapter 1 – Setting our Theoretical Basis 
 
Rather than adopting the narrow argument of theoretical exclusivity, we 
adopt the broader position that causal processes relevant to international 
migration might operate on multiple levels simultaneously, and that sorting 
out which of the explanations are useful is an empirical and not only a 
logical task. Each model must be considered on its own terms and its 
leading tenets examined carefully to derive testable explanations. (Massey 
et al, 1993: 432). 
 
Geography, History, Demography, Anthropology, Sociology, Economics, 
Political Science, Psychology, Cultural Studies, Law. These are some fields of 
study where migration has been debated. It is a multidisciplinary question, 
with fragmented answers and divergent perspectives. Different disciplines and 
theories provide different views on migration, which are often complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive (Castles, 2005: 27). Some attempts to achieve 
a cross-disciplinary approach have been made, but researchers have not yet 
accepted a common ground.  
Migration has turned into a heated debate in recent years, always making 
headlines in terms of security and politics. It is a topic that arises, shrouded 
with myths and fears, which are a symptom of a great misunderstanding in the 
public and political spheres. There are many doubts and questions to be 
answered. Yet, from this wide range of theories we can find some clues. The 
difficult part is that it cannot be found in a single theory. In a world where there 
are multiple variables that lead humans to leave their homes, there must be 
multiple analyses. 
Economic, social, cultural, political, and a hand full of other factors are at 
stake. Some theories are better at analysing the market demand as a driven 
force; other theories try to assess the role of the state. Some of them focus on 
the individual level, while others focus on the international system. They are 
not exclusive and the main challenge for scholars of migration is to engage in 
a fruitful dialogue between disciplines, gathering their expertise and providing 
more of an all-encompassing theory. 
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Theories vary tremendously according to disciplines, regions and ideologies. 
Although it is not within the scope of the present work to address them all, it is 
important to bear this in mind. In this chapter, we will primarily discuss 
theories from Economics and Sociology, an older and established debate, so 
that we can then turn to their use in the more recent Political Science 
theorization. The theories discussed here will be helpful in explaining 
concepts that reverberate within the politics of migration, more specifically the 
neoclassical and migrants network theories that are vital to our understanding 
of the ‘liberal state thesis’ further on, which is the theory we have chosen as 
primary source of analysis. However, in order to better explain the liberal state 
thesis in a comprehensive approach, we will first explain other theories to put 
it in the context of these many different views. 
 
1.1 Neoclassical Economics and Push-Pull Theory 
 
Dating back to E. G. Ravenstein’s laws of migration (1885), theories that 
combine individual rational choice with broader structures of push-pull factors 
have emerged (King, 2012: 13). Neoclassical economics and Push-Pull theory 
assume that the migrant is a rational individual who calculates the costs and 
advantages associated with movement across borders. Thus, international 
migration is comprehended in terms of attraction and repulsion (Pires, 2003: 
63). 
Push-pull models identify economic, environmental, and demographic factors 
that are likely to push people from places of origin and pull them into receiving 
countries1. ‘Pull factors’ normally include demand for labour, availability of 
land, political freedom and economic opportunities, while ‘push factors’ 
usually include population growth and density, lack of economical 
opportunities and political repression (Castles et al., 2014: 28).  
In contemporary theorization, Neoclassical Economics argues that migrants 
from low-wage or labour-surplus countries will tend to move to high-wage or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), Harris and Todaro (1970), Todaro (1976) are part of the 
most important scholars of this theory. 
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labour-scarce country, in moments of disequilibrium between the wages of 
both countries. As a consequence, the sending country sees an increase in its 
wages and a decrease in its workforce, while the supply of labour increases 
and wages decrease in the receiving country. In doing so, they change the 
dynamics of supply and demand for labour in both places and would therefore 
eventually eliminate the need for migration. There is the expectation that a 
equilibrium will be reached.  
Thus, Neoclassical theory central argument concentrates on wages, 
understanding migration as being driven by differences in returns to labour 
across markets (Kurekova, 2011: 5). Movement is then the result of 
disequilibrium between both receiving and sending countries, as Massey et al 
(1998: 25) states: 
 
“A country with a large endowment of labour relative to capital will have a 
low equilibrium market wage (and in the world of Lewis (1954), a labour 
surplus), while a nation with a limited endowment of labour relative to 
capital will be characterized by a high market wage, as depicted 
graphically by the familiar interaction of labour supply and demand curves. 
The resulting differential in wages causes workers from the low-wage or 
labour-surplus country to move to the high-wage or labour-scarce country. 
As a result of this movement, the supply of labour decreases and wages 
eventually rise in the capital-poor country, while the supply of labour 
increases and wages ultimately fall in the capital-rich country, leading, at 
equilibrium, to an international wage differential that reflects only the costs 
of international movement, pecuniary and psychic” 
 
Also, mirroring the flow of workers, there is a flow of investment from capital-
rich to capital-poor countries. This movement includes highly-skilled migrants 
looking for high returns in a human-capital scarce environment. Highlighting 
this difference is important to illustrate that, even in the most aggregated 
macro-level models, the heterogeneity of migrants along skill lines must be 
recognized (Massey et al, 1998: 24). 
There is also a microeconomic model to migration, where the decision making 
	  
14	  
process is seen as a result of individual rational actors decide to emigrate due 
to a cost-benefit calculation. After assessing the costs of their investment into 
moving to another country, in the light of a potentially positive net return, 
mainly in monetary terms, people may decide to migrate. Potential migrants 
estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international locations 
and migrate where net returns are expected to be higher over some timespan 
(Borjas apud Massey et al, 1998: 26).  
 
1.2 Segmented Labour Market Theory 
 
Michael Piore (1979) is one of the most influential proponents of the 
Segmented (or Dual) Labour Market Theory, arguing that international 
migration is not caused by push factors in sending countries but by extremely 
strong pull factors in receiving ones. A permanent demand for migrant labour 
which is inherent to the structure of developed nations, which have a 
segmented labour market in which there is a strong demand for a cheaper 
class of workers to fill jobs, particularly those which domestic workers are not 
likely to be interested in or are not requested. This chronic and unavoidable 
need for foreign workers in some segments of the labour market stems from 
fundamental characteristics of advanced economies and societies (Massey, 
1998: 35).  
Although not entirely contrary to neoclassical theories, it does contain some 
different reasoning. Since demand grows out of structural needs, and is 
encouraged by governments and companies, it does not necessarily go hand 
in hand with wage differentials. In fact, migrants are not able respond to lower 
wages in the same way nationals do, they are held down by social and 
institutional mechanisms. This challenges two mainstream ideas about 
migration: firstly that wealthy nations only need high-skilled migrants, and 
secondly that migrants only respond to wage differentials.  
Within this perspective, foreign workers are seen as a necessary component 
of labour supply in capitalist economies, as they are easier to hire and fire 
than natives. This flexibility relies and preys on their precarious conditions, 
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and the lower wages that they command. They are likely to be hired in 
moments of economic growth and fired during periods of recession, working 
as a cushion in moments of crisis. This theory emerged after the oil crisis in 
1973, when the continuing demand for foreign labour challenged the concepts 
of a purely neoclassical perspective and also the hypothesis that migrants 
would be fired in moments of crisis, as expected by this Marxist theorization.  
However, the dual labour market argument suggests that this demand 
persisted because of segmentation within the market. In a context of strict 
regulation in the domestic labour market, after years of welfare state and 
settled workers’ rights for nationals, migrants worked as a scapegoat to 
secure some sectors of industry with cheaper labour and better relative factor 
costs (Hollifield, 1992: 105). Segmented labour theory points out the 
importance of other factors into human movement, besides a rational wage 
evaluation: 
 
“Dual labour market theory shows the importance of institutional factors as 
well as race and gender in bringing about labour market segmentation. 
(…) The workers in the primary labour market are positively selected on 
the basis of human capital, but also often through membership of the 
majority ethnic group, male gender, and, in the case of migrants, regular 
legal status. Conversely, those in the secondary labour market are 
disadvantaged by lack of education and vocational training, as well as by 
gender, minority status and irregular legal status.” (Castles et al., 2014: 
36) 
 
1.3 World System Theory 
 
Like Segmented Labour Market Theory, World System Theory links migration 
to structural changes, albeit within a demand perspective. The main argument 
is that, due to unequal distribution in political power across nations, the 
expansion of global capitalism has led to the perpetuation of inequalities, and 
reinforcement of a stratified economic order (Massey et al, 1998: 40). Poor 
countries would be kept from the road towards modernization and 
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development, being held by their disadvantaged position. 
 Based on the World System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), it 
analyses the emergence of capitalism and traces its development into a world 
capitalist system with a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery. The core has 
historically experienced the most advanced economic activities, while the 
periphery has provided the raw materials required for it, and the semi-
periphery is involved in a mix of production activities related to both of them. It 
also emphasizes the importance of long economic cycles and how major 
changes in the system are intertwined between all the three areas. Its 
argument suggests that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into 
peripheral, non-capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to 
migration from the periphery towards the core. This migratory process is 
particularly important where ideological and material ties exist which are 
created by prior colonization (Meyers, 2004: 190). 
Being highly influenced by the works of Latin American dependency theorists 
and later neo-Marxist approaches, this historical-structural theory sees 
migration as an unavoidable process that emerges as a natural outcome  of 
the disruptions and dislocations that occur within capitalism. The penetration 
of capitalist economic relations in peripheral countries would then unbalance 
their own economies, fostering a movement. Once land, raw materials and 
labour within peripheral economies fall under the influence of global markets, 
migration flows are generated (Massey et al, 1998: 43). 
Wallerstein’s work on World System Theory has been adapted as a migration 
theory by many scholars; Elizabeth Petras (1981) has been the most 
influential one. She argues that the existence of differential wage zones 
structures migration. On one side, there is a surplus of labour in peripheral 
zones with lower wages, and on the other, a demand for labour in central 
zones with higher wages. Despite expectations, World System Theory argues 
that transnational flow of capitals and industries that move to peripheral 
countries in search for land, raw resources and cheap labour force also 
corroborate with migration (Peixoto, 2004: 26).  
Thus, it reinforces a pattern of migration of high-skilled migrants from central 
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areas to the periphery and less skilled migrants from the periphery to central 
areas. The international flow of labour follows international flows of goods and 
capital, but in the opposite direction (Massey et al, 1998: 48). In total 
opposition to neoclassical theory, migration is here seen as a deepening 
uneven development, exploiting the resources of poor countries to make the 
rich even richer, leading to even more disequilibrium (Castles et al, 2014: 32).  
  
1.4 Migrant Networks 
 
This theory defends that migration is a self-perpetuating and self-sustaining 
phenomenon, with the most important factor being the networks created by 
migrants themselves. Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination 
countries through ties of kinship, friendship and shared origin (Massey et al, 
1998: 49). It does not look at the determinants that initiate migration, but the 
ones that perpetuate it. 
Once a flow is established, a set of impersonal ties that connect migrants, 
former migrants and prospective migrants is shared. This increases the 
likelihood of movement because they help to lower risks and costs, working 
as a safety net. It works as a form of social capital that people can draw upon 
to gain access to easier forms of migration. Therefore, each act of migration 
itself perpetuates its movement, creating social capital among people to 
whom the new migrant is related and raising the odds of their own migration 
(Massey et al, 1998: 50). 
Consequently, social capital is a third resource affecting people’s capability 
and aspiration to migrate, besides financial and human capital. Migrant 
groups develop their own social and economic infrastructure, shops, cafés, 
associations, and the formation of this community within a receiving country 
increases the likelihood of further migration to the same place. It often 
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frustrates governments in their efforts to control migration, proving itself as a 
powerful resource (Castles et al, 2014: 40-41)2.  
Networks make international migration extremely attractive as a strategy for 
risk diversification or utility maximization, because once they are established, 
a job in a new country is within reach for would-be migrants before they move, 
which makes migration more reliable and secure (Massey et al, 1998: 50). 
 
1.5 Migration Systems Theory and Cumulative Causation 
 
Migration systems theory looks at how this exchange of migrants is also 
followed by other forms of exchange, such as goods, ideas, and money. It is 
characterized by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people 
between particular countries and areas, putting migration in a broader process 
of social transformation and development. Akin Mabogunje (1970) was the 
pioneer of this theory, saying that migration systems link people, families and 
communities over space in what today may be called transnational or 
translocal communities (Bakewell et al, 2011: 5). Thus, there would be 
important mechanisms that altogether reinforce migration processes, such as 
illustrated by the table below: 
 Table 1. Important feedback mechanisms perpetuating migration processes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Research on Mexican migrants in the 1970s showed that 90% of them had obtained legal 
residence in the USA through family and employer connections (Portes and Bach apud 
Castles, 2014: 40).	  



















culture of migration 
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Source: Castles et al., 2014: 45. 
 
Migration is thus linked to other forms of exchange. Its causation is cumulative 
in the sense that each act of migration alters the outcomes of the later, 
typically in ways that reinforce this pattern (Massey et al, 1998: 52). Alongside 
this, the theory of cumulative causation, first proposed by Gunnar Myrdal 
(1957) and later reintroduced by Douglas Massey (1990), argues that 
international migration tends to sustain itself over time in ways that encourage 
progressive movement. There are many forms in which migration is affected 
in this cumulative way3: Akin Mabogunje (1970), pioneered migration systems 
theory and argued that through feedback mechanisms, information about the 
migrants reception and progress at the destination is transmitted back home 
and may have an influence upon new migrants (Castles et al, 2014: 43).   
This approach highlights the need to examine both ends of migration flows 
and the links it may create between both ends, Peggy Levitt (1998) called 
‘social remittances’ this flow of ideas, identities, behavioural repertoires and 
social capital. The key implication of this theory is that it connects different 
forms of exchange. For example, if country A has a significant flow of goods 
to country B, it is likely to engender other forms of exchange in both 
directions, including an exchange of people. Migratory movements often arise 
from existent links between countries, whether former colonization, political 
influence, trade, investment or cultural ties (Castles et al, 2014: 44).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  We can highlight eight of them: the expansion of networks, the distribution of income, the 
distribution of land, the organization of agriculture, culture, the regional distribution of human 
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1.6 Migration Transition Theories 
  
Despite their differences, the theories discussed so far share the underlying 
assumption that migration is primarily a consequence of geographical 
inequalities, thus, it can be ‘solved’ by reducing inequalities and stimulating 
development in origin societies (Castles et al, 2014: 48). Yet, empirical 
evidence has not shown that this is the case, whilst in fact it appears that 
development nurtures migration. Migration transition theory tries to demystify 
this question.  
As an explanation as to why development leads to increased migration, this 
set of theories sees migration as a part in a broader process of development, 
social transformation and globalization. They argue that development 
processes do not lead to less migration, as might be expected. Actually, 
development processes are generally associated with increasing levels of 
migration, in a complex and fundamentally non-linear relation. Initially 
developed by Wilbur Zelinsky in The hypothesis of the mobility transition 
(1971), these idea links phases of the demographic transition and 
development processes to distinctive phases in migration. As historical 
experiences support the idea that, beyond a certain level of development, 
societies transform from net emigration into net immigration countries, with 
lower fertility rates and demand for labour (Massey apud Castles et al, 2014: 
48). 
Zelinsky’s model argues that there are patterned regularities in growth of 
personal mobility during recent history, and they are an essential component 
of the modernization process (Zelinsky apud King, 2012: 15). Based on 
Europe’s historical experience, he points out five migration and mobility 
patterns (King, 2012: 15-16):   
 
“1. Pre-modern traditional society: very limited migration, only local 
movements related, e.g., to marriage or to marketing agricultural produce. 
2. Early transitional society: mass rural-urban migration; emigration to 
attractive foreign destinations for settlement and colonisation. 
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3. Late transitional society: slackening of both rural-urban migration and 
emigration; growth in various kinds of circulation, e.g. commuting. 
4. Advanced society: rural-urban replaced by inter-urban migration, mass 
immigration of low-skilled workers from less developed countries; 
international circulation of high-skilled migrants and professionals; intense 
internal circulation, both economic and pleasure related. 
5. Future superadvanced society: better communication and delivery 
systems may lead to a decline in some forms of human circulation; 
internal migration is inter- or intra-urban; continued immigration of low-
skilled labour from less developed countries; possibility of strict controls 
over immigration.” 
 
Ronald Skeldon (1990; 1997) also elaborated upon this idea, emphasizing the 
vital role of state formation. One example is the process of colonization and 
decolonization and its importance in developing economic and political 
connections which, in turn, foster migration. The migration transition of 
Southern European Countries, Asian countries, and more recently Brazil, 
Turkey and China seem to fit this model (Castles et al, 2014: 48-49). King et 
al (1997) extended this analysis to explain how Southern European countries 
such as Italy, Spain and Greece turned from labour-exporting to labour-
importing in the 1970’s.  
 
1.7 Politics of International Migration 
	  
	  
Political Science is a latecomer to the debate on migration. Only recently, the 
field of study has emerged in what can be called politics of international 
migration and theorists are trying to address how to ‘bring the state back in’, 
as Massey pointed out in his groundbreaking work. It is not surprising that 
migration theories are mainly discussed in economic or sociological terms, 
since political scientists took a bit longer to address the questions raised by 
migration. This new field emerges with many influences and considerations in 
regards to previous theorizations. Through these dialogues, politics of 
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international migration mainly try to add the State as an important variable 
and analyse its role in the process.  
The effort of migration scholars in Political Science has been practical rather 
than theoretical, focusing on the extent to which a set of policies was able to 
control immigration (Massey et al 1998: 295). In the few opportunities in which 
the role of the State is discussed, it is through the perspective of the receiving 
state, and the role of the sending state is particularly under-studied (Massey 
et al 1998: 295). The lack of theoretical attention paid to this process does not 
mirror the astonishing importance of immigration as a political issue in 
international relations today. In a world where the quest for control is largely 
discussed and where the securitization of migration is one of the main 
agendas in developed countries, it is surprising to see this theoretical gap. It 
has a lot to do with the fact that migration has only recently assumed a bigger 
role within political science. 
Yet, with the consequences of post-1960s migration it has started to change. 
Although there is no single theory accepted by Political Scientists for the 
explanation of international migration, only a series of fragmented sets of 
theories within different disciplinary frameworks, it finally got their attention. 
Hollifield and Wong (2014) offer a historical and a theoretical explanation for 
the lack of interest in migration, at least among students of American politics4. 
The first one lies in the long hiatus between the end of the third wave of 
migration in the 1920s and the beginning of the fourth in the 1970s and 
1980s. When migration levels started to rise, immigration policy was still seen 
as ‘low politics’, a domestic issue with little to say in the wider sphere of 
international relations.  
The second explanation is that migration was nonetheless important in the 
study of comparative politics, especially among ‘Europeanists’. With this mea 
culpa, they argue that, after countries in Western Europe opened their doors 
to migrants in the post-war period, the subject became an important political 
issue of scholars in more different areas – both geographical and academic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This work is part of a book edited by Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield, Migration 
Theory: talking across disciplines, where perspectives from diferente disciplines are 
presented. It does not, however, achieves it purpose of a dialogue between then, as it 
remains one of the main challenges for migration theorization. 	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Yet only in the past 30 years has the field of study emerged as politics of 
international migration; and theorists are scrambling to see how we might be 
able to ‘bring the state back in’ (Hollifield, Wong, 2014: 146). In this 
subchapter, we will address some of these attempts, and focus on the liberal 
state thesis, the theoretical basis of our analysis. 
 
1.8 The importance of Nationhood 
	  
	  
Rogers Brubaker instigated a line of thought with a historical approach that 
tries to explain the difference in forms of civic self-definition and patterns of 
civic incorporation, comparing France and Germany. It argues that the unique 
history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well 
as debates over national identity and social tensions, shape the states’ 
migration policies (Meyers, 2000: 1251). Brubaker (1992: 14) sustains that the 
sharply differing ways of defining citizenry, crystallized in the decades before 
the World War I, still echo in today’s policies. 
Hence, domestic closure against non-citizens rests on the self-understanding 
of modern states as nation states, whose legitimacy depends on the 
expression of wills and furthering of the interests of distinctive and bounded 
nations (Brubaker, 1992: 28). Thus, the modern nation state is nationalistic 
and exclusive, and every state establishes a conceptual, legal, and ideological 
boundary between its citizens and foreigners. He dichotomizes state 
treatment of migrants into historical ius solis and ius sanguinis policies, where 
ius solis refers to the attribution of citizenship by birth on the territory of the 
state and ius sanguinis refers to the attribution of citizenship through parents’ 
citizenship. Into analysing German and French differentials, he argues that: 
 
“The state-centered, assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France 
is embodied and expressed in an expansive definition of citizen- ship, one 
that automatically transforms second-generation immigrants into citizens, 
assimilating them—legally—to other French men and women. The 
ethnocultural, differentialist understanding of nationhood in Germany is 
	  
24	  
embodied and expressed in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably 
open to ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, but remarkably closed to non-German immigrants.” (Brubaker, 
1992: 3) 
Conversely, France state-centered assimilationalist perspective is reflected by 
the recognition of second-generation migrants into citizens, assimilating them 
legally into the French population. On the other side of the spectrum lays 
Germany, the ethnocultural, differentialist understanding of which regarding 
nationhood is reflected in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably open to 
ethnic German immigrants at the same time as being remarkably closed and 
inaccessible to non-German migrants (Brubaker, 1992: 3). 
According to this interpretation, national traditions would guide the likely 
course of policy-making, based on the State’s notions of self-understanding 
and ways of dealing with their own citizens. Although extremely important and 
revealing to some extent, this explanation may be questioned in light of recent 
events. France has become the stage of a right-wing uprising against 
migrants, while Germany has changed its course towards a more open 
society to non-Germans. Yet, most of his arguments are interesting and 
necessary for a continuous debate on how self-understanding as a nation can 
expand or narrow the limits of citizenship. 
John Higham (1955) and Maldwyn Jones (1960) offer a more comprehensive 
analysis, arguing that social cleavages, social unrest and industrial unrest 
within American society foster xenophobia (Meyers, 2000: 1253). It is caused 
by the fear of losing national identity and of a national breakdown, being a 
psychological phenomenon that cannot be neglected by social scientists.  
Throughout recent years we have witnessed the rise of identity politics and 
how nation based arguments are forcing their way into migration debate, 







1.9 International Human Rights and Postnational Citizenship 
	  
	  
Yasemin Soysal focuses on the post war era to unfold a new concept based 
on universal personhood rather than national belonging. She questions the 
predominant assumption that citizenship is imperatively national and proposes 
a postnational citizenship. Derived from the transnational discourse and 
structure celebrating human rights in the international arena, postnational 
citizenship confers upon every person the right to participation regardless of 
their cultural ties (Soysal, 1994: 3). 
She reminds us that the unfolding of the nation state in Europe also 
encompassed migration flows, demanding new terminologies to manifest 
these new boundaries between nationals and aliens. These newly created 
physical, cultural and ideological boundaries were forged. Citizenship then 
acquired exclusionary properties through compulsory education, conscription, 
national welfare and so on. Furthermore, her bold statement maintains that 
the traditional concept of national citizenship is diminishing due to the 
emergence of a post-national citizenship. 
Saskia Sassen (1996) argues that sovereignty itself has been challenged, and 
that territorial exclusivity as a distinctive feature of the modern state is 
undermined by globalization (Meyers, 2000: 1267). She concludes that a 
combination of pressures have restricted sovereignty of the state and reduced 
its autonomy where migration policy is concerned, such as: de facto regimes 
on human rights, the circulation of capital, ethnic lobbies, EU institutions, and 
so on. 
In the same line of thought, David Jacobson claims that ‘transnational 
citizenship is slowly eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership’ 
(Jacobson apud Triadafilopoulos; Zaslove, 2006: 174). As global human rights 
norms are expanded and consolidated, migrants’ status to access protections 
and privileges once restricted only to nationals is facilitated. His analysis 
suggests that the nation-state is being transformed under the impact of the 
transnational movement of people, and its reforming of the way social and 
political community is constituted (Jacobson, 1996: 133). Polity is in the 
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process of being transposed to a transnational level as an entity based on 
human rights code, while the state becomes the institutional forum of that 
legal-political order (Jacobson, 1996: 133). He argues that human rights code 
became a mechanism through which states could respond to changing 
structural conditions and challenges that transnational movement has posed, 
such as the exclusivity of citizenship and nationality.  
 In Soysal’s and Jacobson’s accounts traditional political actors are seen with 
less importance faced with this normative change in the global order. The 
state is not en route to self-destruction, being supplanted by the international 
order. It is changing its role once more, adapting to an era of globalization and 
transnationality. Although it might be a process in course and we cannot 
neglect its insights, it is not exactly a reality for many migrants’ lives yet. They 
know how important traditional actors; visa control, borders, federal police and 
many others are to their daily routine.  
 
1.10 Marxist and Neomarxist Approaches 
	  
	  
Marxist and neomarxist theories understand immigration policies as an 
outcome of economic competition, comprehending how economic factors and 
a class-based political process shape policies (Meyers, 2004: 6). Migrants are 
seen as a reserve army of industrial labour, and migration as a part of 
capitalist development and of the international division of labour. Thus, being 
a structural part of capitalism itself, which encourage movement from 
countries of uneven development (Meyers, 2000: 1248).  
Immigration serves the ruling capitalist class in a variety of ways (Portes, 
1981; Petras apud Meyers, 2000: 1248-1249). As an industrial reserve army, 
they are used to force down working-class wages. They also supply capitalists 
with labour for the expanding process of capital accumulation, providing 
cheap labour and maintaining their profits even in moments of inflation. They 
work as cushions for sudden fluctuations in economic activity as a result of 
the flexible and precarious nature of their work. Additionally, they divide the 
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working class even further in relation to the bourgeoisie, as nationals normally 
understand migrants as competitors.  
According to Castells (apud Meyers, 2000: 1249), migrant labour works as the 
ideal medicine for capitalist crises, since they are productive in its 
expansionary phase and easily expendable in the recessionary phase, without 
damaging the economy because their low wages are not relevant in terms of 
consumption in the market. World System theory is derived from the Marxist 
approach imbibed in Wallerstein’s work, which is important for showing a 
macro-level analysis, but which tells us little about immigration policy itself. 
Still, they are quite relevant in terms of analysis of the perpetuation of ties 
from colonization and its permanence in contemporary migration 
 
1.11 Domestic Politics: Interest Group and Partisan Politics 
	  
	  
Likewise Marxist theories discussed above, domestic politics also argues that 
employers’ demand for labour and fluctuation in the economy and in the 
labour market influence control policies (Meyers, 2004: 6). However, they 
have different understandings of this process5. Here, the state is seen as a 
neutral arena for societal interest, represented by interest groups and parties 
(Joppke, 1998).  Policy making is understood to be the result of bargaining, as 
well as of compromises between these interests; changes in migration policy 
are derived from situational socio-economic factors (Meyers, 2000: 1257). 
Freeman (2015) states that, from the perspective of political economy, it is 
neither rights nor liberal norms that determine immigration policies and 
politics, but interests. While economists seek to determine the impact of 
migration on empirical economic indicators, political economists acknowledge 
that this process is socially defined in ways that are not reflected with the 
underlying empirical reality (Freeman 2015). Freeman (1986) stresses that 
states are usually operating in a dominant policy making style. Thus, 
analysing the distinction between intentions and outcomes, we can discover if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Aristide Zolberg (1981), Gary Freeman (1995), Christian Joppke (1998), and Eytan Meyers 
(2000) are some of its proponents.	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the elite’s behaviour is rigid or adaptive and predict their policies. There is the 
possibility that styles may fluctuate with changes in the complexion of the 
government, so it is important to fully analyse domestic actors, and under 
which pressures are they operating, in order to properly comprehend 
migration policies. 
Freeman (1995) argues that the typical model of immigration politics in liberal 
democracies is client politics, where the benefits are concentrated and costs 
are diffuse. This gives those who expect to gain from migration stronger 
incentives to organize, and it should be associated with expansive policies 
(Freeman, 2015: 4). In the interest group political process, organized interests 
try to force parties, legislators and administrators to adopt specific policies 
(Meyers, 2000: 1258). Through identifying social agents capable of shaping 
immigration policies in domestic politics, many of these works look to assess 
the underlying pressures and possibilities that constrain migration policies. 
 
1.12 Realist Approach 
	  
	  
None of the previous theories focus on the state as much as realist theories 
do, here the state is seen as the main agent in international relations6. If 
within the state borders it is the sole power, outside there is an anarchical 
society in which its national interests might conflict with others. There is no 
harmony, the state can - and will - use power to fulfil its goals and as any 
state can do the same, there is a constant need to be prepared for violence or 
else they will face the consequences of weakness in the international scenario 
(Waltz, 1979: 198). 
Through the realist approach, actual or potential conflicts among states, 
including military ones, have shaped migration policies (Meyers, 2000: 1263). 
It does not imply that all policies will be restrictive as one might expect; in fact 
it can work both ways. Since the Second World War, countries have accepted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Mainly deriving from works of Stanley Hoffman (1960), Hans Morgenthau (1973), Kenneth 
Waltz (1979), and Robert Keohane (1986).	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and even encouraged migration for their reconstruction. Europe then faced an 
increase in movement from refugees to guest workers with liberal policies.  
As realist theory is largely accepted in international relations, migration has 
remained outside their field of interest. It is seen primarily as a debate of low 
politics, that has no space in comparison to national security and military 
conflicts. However, with the recent war on terror and the securitization of 
migration, realists have been forced to deal with the problem. It has echoed in 
the realist approach the state’s growing concern with aliens trying to assess 
their countries and possible acts of violence from foreign groups, predicting a 
more restrictive moment in migration history.  
Migration has become subject to securitization, with states and societies 
looking at newcomers as if they were threats to their national well being 
(Zogata-Kusz, 2012: 8). They propose that a state must take into 
consideration these threats in order to decide their policies, number, type, 
level of similarity and possible assimilation, and so on. Didier Bigo (2005) 
even stands the argument of inassimilability, as the possibility of a group of 
migrants to threaten national identity in such a negative impact that social and 
state security are at stake. 
Similarly, Anastassia Tsoukala (2005) refers to three types of threats 
perceived by anti-immigrant arguments: a socio economic principle (i.e. rise of 
unemployment, dependency on the welfare state, deterioration of the urban 
environment), a securitarian principle (rise of criminality, urban insecurity, 
terrorism), and an identity principle (changes in demographic balance and the 
receiving society’s identity). Although these theorists may not share the same 
racist anti-immigration motives of right wing movements across the globe, 
they reverberate many of their thoughts. 
 
1.13 Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
	  
	  
Although neo-liberal theory agrees that the state acts on behalf of its own 
interests, it is much more positive with regards to the actions that it can take, 
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and cooperation is seen as one of them. They put great faith in institutions 
and their role in the harmonization of states’ interests, and in the fostering of 
cooperative strategies. Neo-liberals argue that placing a focus on relative 
gains is misguided, as economic interdependence ensures that neither side 
can effectively exploit the economic relationship and take advantage of the 
other politically.  
The neo-liberal institutionalist model argues that, through international 
institutions and regimes, states can overcome dilemmas of common interests 
and facilitate their coordination (Keohane, 1985; Baldwin, 1992). However, it 
is hard to apply this model in terms of migration, since supranational 
organizations have had limited influence on that matter and it remains mostly 
a domestic affair. Yet, the European Union and international law regarding 
asylum for refugees would be the main exception to this situation.  
 
1.14 Political Institutional Thesis 
	  
	  
Although institutions are the central analysis here, these scholars are talking 
at a different level and with a different perspective. They suggest that the 
erosion of political parties and other traditional political institutions - at the 
domestic level - is primarily responsible for the surging of anti-immigration 
parties and the loss of control of immigration and immigrant policy by 
government (Messina, 2007: 105).  
They argue that a political institutional breakdown, a decline precipitated by 
factors unrelated to migration but intensified by it, is the main factor of the 
state's inadequacy in regards to its dealing with migration and other policies. 
As Anthony Messina (2007: 105) summarizes: 
“This perspective essentially denies or suspends judgment about whether 
immigration and/or immigrant policy are inherently problematic. Rather, it 
links the failure of states to execute an economically rational and stable 
immigration policy and a humane and politically viable immigrant policy, 





With the growing politicization of migration in contemporary politics (Castles et 
al, 2014, Hollifield et al, 2014), an area of public policy which was once 
exclusively in the realm of political executives and bureaucracies spilled over 
to the most diverse arenas. Other actors came into play, such as migrants 
associations, anti-immigration parties, and national courts, with policy 
references that are divergent and even unclear.  
Therefore, this model argues that institutions should be strengthened in order 
to guarantee their policy prerogatives. Yet, they assume that it is reasonable 
to expect different countries to be dealing with different levels of controlling 
policies, but positive change within the domestic contexts is likely to swing the 
pendulum of control back in favour of domestic elites (Messina, 2007: 206).  
	  
1.15 Liberal State Thesis 
	  
	  
Migrants have challenged the nation state in many aspects; sovereignty, 
identity, state control, and citizenship. Yet, for this group of scholars, these 
dilemmas are even more flagrant in liberal democracies. Hollifield (1992: 204) 
defined this liberal paradox, identifying the main difficulty for liberal states in 
regulating immigration as being: how to deal with foreign workers who, as 
commodities, are subject to the full force of market relations, but as 
individuals are entitled to certain protections by virtue of their humanity.  
In the liberal state thesis there are three variables that explain the persistence 
of migration and the failed attempts in controlling it: push-pull factors, 
networks and rights. This thesis is convenient for us in terms of analysis 
because it corresponds with many of the trends identified by the theories 
discussed above, but including the importance of rights in liberal societies7. It 
primarily attributes the loss of policy control to the problematic nature of 
migration and migration policy, where states are committed to increasingly 
open their markets as well as liberal political rights (Messina, 2007: 96). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 It argues that, during the post-war period, migration received its impetus from 
the state, in terms of recruitment policies for guest workers, and from the 
market, in terms of a high demand for labour. After the oil crisis in 1973, statist 
measures were taken. The administrative state attempted simply to dismantle 
a highly developed international labour market (Hollifield, 1992: 222). The 
political consensus for suspending worker immigration, banning foreign 
workers, encouraging the return of settled migrants, and preventing family 
reunifications were ineffective (Hollifield, 1992: 222). For the liberal state 
thesis, this unexpected difficulty in controlling migration is a result and a 
symptom of the increasing liberalization of Western polities.  
The fact that migration persists in moments of crisis, amidst restrictive policies 
and against the tide of a strong anti-immigration movement indicates that 
push pull factors can no longer be seen to be the sole answer. Yet, it does not 
mean that push pull factors are to be taken out of the equation. It 
acknowledges that market demand is a powerful driving force for migration, 
along with wage differentials and the motives listed by neoclassical theory. In 
fact, the spread of market relations in the international economy, and 
particularly the evolution of an international labour market, have fostered an 
economic and political space where migration is more likely to happen and the 
state is less likely to be able to control it (Messina, 2007: 100).  
It was thought that guest workers would easily understand when it was time to 
leave, but it was not true. They have entrenched their lives into the new 
societies, building their expectations and relations. As chain migration and 
networks theorists have noticed, others often follow an initial migration from 
the same family or community. Such links are vital resources for individuals 
and groups, since these networks provide some basis for process of 
settlement and community formation in the receiving country. Hence, this 
social capital is one of the most important variables.  
The migration flow experienced in the 1960s and 1970s was initiated by push 
pull factors, persisted through the existence of networks and is now coming 
under protection of rights. Although these three variables are not to be 
understood in term of phases, it is interested to note that they have been 
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working simultaneously towards a state of self-perpetuity. 
Under liberal constitutions, foreigners have rights that are not so easily 
dismissed, even in the wake of anti-immigrant parties and xenophobia. States 
are constrained by constitutional norms, procedures, and an international 
regime on human rights. These constraints are not only ideological in terms of 
left and right, but they are legal and institutional (Hollifield, 1992: 228).  
There are links between the domestic and supranational levels, with a spill-
over effect from the international system that leads states to act in a more 
rights-based approach towards migrants. The failure of statist arguments is 
likely to continue due to the enduring liberalization of democracies: 
 
‘Statist arguments suffer from a major flaw. It is possible for a democratic 
state to be autonomous, that is, relatively independent of groups (unions, 
employers, civil rights groups, and so on) in certain policy areas, yet weak 
in its ability to implement policy. The strong/weak state argument tends to 
break down altogether when we take into account the wide variations in 
the ability of democratic states to formulate and implement policy from one 
area to another. (…) 
It follows that strong states are not necessarily those that act 
independently of groups or against the tide of market conditions. Rather, 
state strength implies an ability to shape market incentives and minimize 
interference in policy implementation by a range of interest groups. “ 
(Hollifield, 1992: 227) 
 
Hollifield understands that international migration is a prime indicator of 
interdependence and of liberal-institutional development in international 
relations, which is due in part to an ‘imbibed liberalism’. He defends that, 
since the states recognized themselves as liberal democracies they could not 
limit the influx of people, and that they had to at least accept migrants on the 
basis of family reunification or refugee law because of a regime of human 
rights. This intrinsic liberalism means that rights, as norms and principles, act 
to constrain the power of states both in their treatment of individual migrants 
and in their relation to other states.  
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The rights-based liberalism is related to the spread of market relations, but is 
also closely associated with ideas of social justice as well as individual and 
group entitlements (Hollifield, 1992: 170). Civil, political, and social are 
derived primarily from the laws and institutions of the liberal state and a 
democratic regime (Hollifield et al, 2014: 274). Once rights are extended, 
normally through a complex and possibly long process, it is increasingly 
difficult to revert them (Hollifield et al, 2014: 274).    
Redefining the relationship between the state and individuals and groups, 
through a process of political struggle inherent to liberal democracies, has 
altered the capacity of states to control immigration and given rise to a 
multiculturalism that has redefined the social contract in many ways 
(Kymlicka, 1995). This Tocquevillian vision of citizenship is broader and more 
pluralist, anchored firmly in the civic culture (Hollifield, 1992: 175). 
In Europe, the right to exclude has been undermined by patterns of economic 
integration that have provided for freer movement of people, goods, and 
capital within the single market that has been supported by an influential and 
highly mobile transnational capitalist class (Cowles apud Geddes, 2000: 3). 
The history of market expansion cannot be detached from the history of 
migration itself, as they are part of a vicious circle that states do not entirely 
control. 
Hollifield (1992) affirms that a commitment between the state and market has 
been responsible for liberalizing politics, allowing foreign workers. What 
neither of them is able to control is the fact that, once these migrants set foot 
in another country, they carry with them everything else besides their 
workforce: expectations, relationships, cultural differences, social ties, and 
everything else that makes us human. Thus, a rights-based orientation is 
crucial to reconcile market needs, state policies and migrants. Hence, we 
have decided on using the liberal state thesis as our primary level of analysis 
in Chapter Three. It is our choice because it allows us to understand migration 
through one theoretic approach that does not deny the importance of other 
findings. Thus, we can see in it the importance of push-pull factors, of 
networks, of transnational human rights, migration policies, and so on. 
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Without neglecting relevant findings in other theories and through this broader 




Chapter Two – Crossing the Atlantic Frontier 
	  
Like many birds, but unlike most animals, humans are a migratory 
species. Indeed, migration is as old as humanity itself.  
Massey et al (1998: 1) 
	  
The modern history of international migration is not a novelty, it starts with 
women and men leaving sub-Saharan Africa and exploring different 
continents. Unsurprisingly, migration flows today are very much more 
distinctive than they once were. Since the end of the Second World War, 
migration has transformed and evolved alarmingly. It is necessary to 
understand its new characteristics in order to fully comprehend the context 
into which Brazilian flow to Portugal is inserted. 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the main flow of 
migration was from industrialized Europe to ‘new’ rural areas of the globe. 
They were trading one region, intensive in labour, for another, rich in land 
(Hatton and Williamson apud Massey et al, 1998: 9). Until 1925, 85% of all 
international migrants were Europeans, a trend that shifted after the 1960’s 
when they came to represent a small fraction of worldwide migration flow, and 
in their place migration from Africa, Asia, and Latin America started to 
increase (Ferenczi apud Massey et al, 1998: 7). Not only it was a variation in 
origin countries, but also in destinations. Countries in Western Europe were 
now considerably attractive to these new migration flows, changing the 
previous pattern. 
Although differences between migration flows may be many, Castles et al 
(2014, p. 16) summarize certain general tendencies that are quite informative, 
and all intertwined. One of these is the globalization of migration, as the 
involvement of more countries in migration flows, with migrants from 
increasingly diverse areas of the globe, with different economic, social and 
cultural backgrounds. Today, most host countries receive migrants from a 
broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds. But there has 
been a change in the direction of dominant migration flows, with many 
Western European countries turned into receiving countries, and with an 
increase of South-North migration and a new global pole of attraction in the 
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richest nations of the Gulf. The proliferation of migration transition has turned 
traditional lands of emigration into lands of immigration, such as Portugal 
whilst, on the other hand, countries such as Brazil have experienced a shift 
from the latter to the former. It does not mean that the reverse movement has 
ceased, but that now they deal with a new and challenging circumstance.  
It is also connected with another characteristic of contemporary migration: the 
differentiation of migration, when most countries experience numerous types 
of migration at the same time; such as labour migration, family reunion and 
educational. If, until the 1960’s, women were often pre-supposed as falling 
under the 'family reunion' category, the feminization of labour migration has 
finally questioned that. Scholars now acknowledge the role of women in 
migration and its exponential increase. An example is that more than fifty per 
cent of Brazilians in Portugal are women, a recent trend that shows signs of 
permanence. 
All these changes did not go unnoticed in the realm of politics, indeed they 
have become commonplace in the political debate. There is an undeniable 
politicization of migration, either in domestic politics and policies governing 
national security, or regional relationships and bilateral agreements. The 
debate goes from the Right to the Left, and everything in between. It is 
becoming a potential driving factor in the electoral arena and a central issue 
of public policy in most advanced industrial democracies.  
Contemporary migration flows are quite distinctive and far more complex than 
in the previous industrial era. As Massey et al (1998: 13) point out, there are 
many contradictions. Within sending countries there is an imbalance between 
labour supply and demand, while receiving countries face demographic 
changes that produce a limited supply of workers. Capital-intensive 
technologies demand native workers with high skill, and a segmented demand 
for a cheaper migrant workforce. The growing anxiety over ethnic diversity, 
and the restrictive policies that result in receiving states, are also gaining 
ground. There is an obvious unsettling scenario in which a focus on new 
approaches to migration is necessary. Migration challenges deep-seated 
notions of nationality, citizenship and the state itself, as Will Kymlicka (apud 
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Hollifield et al, 2014: 19) stress it: 
 
‘Redefining the relationship between the state and individuals and groups, 
through a process of political struggle, has had a great impact on the 
capacity of democratic states to control immigration, and it has given rise 
to a new multiculturalism that in many ways has redefined the social 
contract’. 
 
This chapter will focus on the transitions that both countries have experienced 
in the last decades. Thus, showing how their paths have crossed, but this time 
in a new direction – a movement from the south of the Atlantic to the north. 
We will then present the context of Brazilian migration to Portugal, explaining 
its two waves: from the 1980s until the 1990s, and from the 1990s until, 
possibly, today. In sub-chapters 2.3 and 2.4 we will deal with treaties and 
bilateral agreements that have reinforced Brazilians’ migrants rights, and 
facilitated their integration. In the final sub-chapter, we will focus on the period 
from 2003 until 2013, aiming to test our hypothesis that this set of rights 
fostered a migration flow and enhanced settlement patterns.  
 
2.1 Latecomers to Migration – Brazil’s and Portugal’s Transition 
	  
	  
Hollifield et al (2014: 31) describes latecomers to migration as: 
‘(…) Those countries that did not have notable immigration in the early 
decades of the post-World War II era (the 1950’s through the 1970’s) 
because labour demands could be successfully met by internal migration 
from poorer regions, increased utilisation of previously untapped labour 
sources, and/or mechanisation and rationalisation of production. 
In recent years, however, these countries have begun to import large 
numbers of immigrants because of negative demographic trends (which 
are worse than in other countries), as well as structural and economic and 
labour market needs mainly created by relatively recent economic growth 
(after the 1970’s in some cases). However, the percentage of foreign born 
residents remains quite low in most of these countries, which generally do 
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not officially consider themselves to be countries, much less nations, of 
immigrants. In addition, all of these countries were prominent exporters of 
immigrant labour in the recent past, when they were less industrialized 
(…)” 
 
Similarly, Castles et al (2014: 113) discuss Southern European migration 
transitions as the shift in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal from purely 
emigrate nations to ones of increasing immigration8. During the 1970’s these 
newly democratized countries started to experience steady economic growth 
at the same time as their birth rates were decreasing. This generated a 
demand for labour that could no longer be supplied only by nationals. They 
have turned to countries from North Africa, Latin America, Asia and Eastern 
Europe (King apud Castles et al, 2014: 113). At first, the percentage of 
foreign-born workers was not outstanding, which kept them out of sight from 
theorists.  
They were known emigration countries. However, the on going economic and 
social change was determinant to their turn in the recent decades.  This 
characteristic was particularly reinforced as a result of the Great Economic 
Crisis. It is a dissonant feature from other latecomers, which partially explains 
why studies in the field tend to neglect the country. It is, in our opinion, a 
mistake, perhaps because of a sense of denial from Portugal itself to 
understand this new moment of migration.  
 
Portuguese Migration Transition 
“Sal-laden sea, how much of all your salt 
Is tears of Portugal! 
For us to cross you, how many sons have kept, 
Vigil in vain, and mothers wept! 
Lived as old maids how many brides-to-be 
Till death, that you might be ours, sea! 
Was it worth while? It is worth while, all, 
If the soul is not small.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Similarly, Hollifield et al have studied the migration transition in Italy, Spain, Japan and 
South Korea in their work Controlling Immigration: A global perspective (2014). 	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Portuguese Ocean, Fernando Pessoa. 
Translated by Peter Rickard. 
 
Immortalized in poems, songs, literature and a whole sense of national 
identity, Portuguese movement across the globe has a quite strong feature: it 
is related to colonization. In the end of the fifteenth century they started to 
explore the ocean that was their border, going to Ceuta (1415), Porto Santo 
(1420), Madeira (1425), and further south and east (Baganha apud Garcia, 
2000: 15). Although it is hard to characterize this mass movement as 
migration, being as it is a part of a conquest and colonization process, it is 
true to say that it established connections between Portugal and other 
countries, enabling migration until today. The need for colonizers for the 
‘newly discovered’ regions was urgent and this movement never ceased, 
although it may have changed. For most of the XVII, XVIII and XIX centuries, 
Brazil tended to be the most important receiving country (Garcia, 2000; 
Barbosa, 2003: 176). 
Up until Brazilian independence, it is quite clear why and how both countries 
were connected. However, the migratory movement post-independence is 
more noteworthy for our work. Brazil’s migratory policies were extremely 
influential at the time. With two fundamental objectives: the gradual transition 
agreed with England to abolish slavery, thus looking for workers abroad, and 
to populate and explore its immense area. It was not only the Portuguese that 
arrived in the recently independent country, but it was most notably them. 
Around 1 million Portuguese citizens migrated to the former colony until the 
end of the nineteenth century (Garcia, 2000: 17).  
After years of restrictive Portuguese policies that attempted to avert a possible 
demographic disequilibrium and to lower the number of nationals leaving the 
country, the 1870’s were a lot more liberal in terms of migration. This shift can 
be explained with the importance that remittances from Portuguese abroad 
gained, along with the need to foster a migration flow towards Africa, where it 
was needed for administrative purposes on the colony. Driven by economic 
motives, many poor Portuguese nationals decided to look for opportunities in 
gold rich Brazil. Not all of them succeeded and not all of them returned. A 
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settlement pattern started to arise. In the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, around 93,1% (220.000) of Portuguese migrants were destined for 
Brazil (Garcia, 2000: 19). This number might be even higher if we assume 
illegal migration, which is enough for us to say that it was the most important 
moment in this transoceanic movement. 
However, the economic crisis in 1929 brought about restrictive migration 
policies from Brazil, which lowered this number considerably. Even so, it 
remained high, although now other important flows existed – United States, 
Argentina, Venezuela. During the Second World War, restrictive policies from 
both countries interfered, along with the difficulties of travelling during times of 
war. In the post-war era there was another increase, although the previous 
numbers would never be reached. 
During the seventies, two major changes occurred in the story of Portuguese 
migration: Europe became the main destination and Portugal started to evolve 
into a receiving country. The first phenomenon is related to the economic 
growth in Europe in the post-war period and the need for labour in countries 
such as France and Germany, with considerably stronger economies than 
Portugal. Some of them were leaving the dictatorship, or trying to escape 
military service in the colonies at war, or one of many other reasons.  
Undeniably, Southern European countries had plenty of poor workers willing 
to move to the industrialized Northern countries and live under precarious 
conditions to earn a better salary than at home. In the early 1960s, Brazil 
ceases to be the main destination and France takes this position. This new 
intra-European movement marks a shift from the transoceanic tradition.. 
Portugal becomes a pre-eminent exporter of labour in Western Europe, along 
with other neighbouring countries.  
Conversely, the seventies presented some changes within the landscape of 
Portuguese immigration as well, with the oil crisis in 1973 and the Carnation 
Revolution in 1974. With the decolonization of former African colonies, a mass 
movement towards Portugal started. Portuguese citizens leaving the colonies 
behind, and Africans seeking better opportunities in a European country with 
a shared history, came to challenge migration flows. In 1970, only 0,3% of 
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inhabitants were foreigners. By 1981 this had increased by 339% to 1,1% of 
inhabitants (Lages et al, 2006, p 61).  
Yet it was only in the 1990s that immigration surpassed emigration flows, with 
a more diverse influx of migrants. Without any policies that specifically 
fostered migration, the 2000s continued to see an increase in numbers. Since 
2007, Brazilians have been the biggest community, as we can see in the table 
below. Along with other former African colonies, it is undeniable how it is still 
pertinent to understand colonialism as an important factor in Portuguese 
migration to this day. Still, countries without these ties are also gaining 
importance, which adds a new characteristic and only confirms this new 
immigration present in Portuguese history.  
Figure 1. Portuguese Migrant Population in 2013 
	  
Source: SEF Report, 2014. 
 
Portugal’s traditional role as country of origin for migrants is now joined with 
the challenges of being a receiving country. Precisely because of its confusing 
relationship with traditional emigration and recent immigration, Portugal is an 
interesting country for analysis. Hence, it is interesting to take a closer look of 
how it developed and its correlation to the Portuguese – and Brazilian – 
migration transition in the 1970’s. As a useful dialogue between northern and 
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southern spaces, the Iberian country works as a suitable case study for us. 
 
Brazilian Migration Transition 
 
Migration in Brazil is intrinsic to its former colonial past, as already pointed 
out. In a parallel with migration flows in other Latin American countries, 
Pellegrino (2003) divides the migration history into four different stages, which 
are quite revealing. First, from ‘discovery’ until independence, with a huge 
flow of European colonizers and African slaves. Although the distinction 
between colonizers and migrants is not always clear, Portugal was the main 
source of personnel flow towards Brazil for many years. Yet a more 
disturbing, and often neglected, feature of our colonization is that African 
slaves were also displaced to Brazil in great numbers. After this period, a 
second instance of European migration occurs in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, along with many changes in Brazilian history.  
With the abolition of slavery, Europeans mainly supplied a new demand for 
free – and white – labour. Also, there was then the need to populate the vast 
empty areas of the newly independent country, especially those sharing a 
border with Spanish colonies. It is actually after independence that migration 
becomes more interesting for us, between the late 19th and the early 20th 
centuries. Germans were sent to the South of the country to explore large 
rural areas. Italians were mainly set in the coffee plantations in the state of 
São Paulo, later joined by the Japanese. Lebanese, Russians, Spanish, and 
Syrians also started to arrive. Although extremely important to Brazil’s diverse 
background, none of these groups could be as important as the Portuguese in 
the process of nation building, as we can see in the table below, either 
because of the amount of migrants or because of the steadiness of this 





Table 2. Migration to Brazil 1810 - 1979 
Decade Portugal Italy Spain Germany Other Total 
1810 - 1819 
    
1.790 1.790 
1820 - 1829 
   
2.326 5.439 7.765 
1830 - 1839 230 180 
 
207 2.021 2.638 
1840 - 1849 491 5 10 4.450 2.347 7.303 
1850 - 1859 63.272 24 181 15.815 38.300 117.592 
1860 - 1869 53.618 4.916 633 16.514 34.432 110.113 
1870 - 1879 67.609 47.100 3.940 14.627 60.555 193.831 
1880 - 1889 104.700 276.724 29.166 19.201 98.177 527.968 
1891 - 1899 215.534 690.365 164.093 17.014 118.977 1.205.983 
1900 - 1909 199.536 221.394 21.504 13.848 93.644 549.926 
1910 - 1919 312.481 137.868 181.657 25.902 163.550 821.458 
1920 - 1929 301.915 106.831 81.931 75.839 277.006 843.522 
1930 - 1939 102.544 22.170 13.746 13.746 165.617 317.823 
1940 - 1949 47.556 11.359 5.003 6.885 2.865 73.668 
1950 - 1959 241.520 94.012 94.693 16.827 139.618 586.670 
1960 - 1969 74.124 12.414 28.397 5.659 76.993 197.587 
1970 - 1979 5.641 3.382 2.196 3.817 31.219 46.255 
Total 1.790.771 1.628.744 627.150 252.677 1.312.550 5.611.892 
Source: Hernando; Martinez apud Finotelli et al (2003: 226) 
 
During the third phase, a movement toward the former colonial power is 
instigated, along with a regional migration flow. In Latin America, this period 
was between the 1930’s and 1960’s. In the last two decades of the 20th 
century, new countries are seen as potential destination countries. In the 
Brazilian case, migration to the former colonial power has developed a bit 
later and is still quite strong, having experienced different stages of its own.  
 More recently, both countries have experienced changes in their migration 
patterns that crossed their ways. Alongside the Portuguese transition, Brazil 
sees its turn in the 1980’s. In this decade, known as the ‘lost decade’ due to a 
difficult economic crisis, that emigration becomes a reality to a country that 
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until then had only experienced immigration, and in such high levels. It is at 
that moment that Portugal, although no longer a sending country, becomes a 
receiving country for many Brazilians. 
Thus, Brazilians looked for countries whose living conditions would be better; 
and they have found three main options. The United States and Europe came 
as an answer for those looking for social mobility that seemed unlikely in the 
Latin American country. Japan was a good choice for temporary migration, 
especially for second or third generation Japanese migrants in Brazil. 
Paraguay was a third one, with a great demand for agricultural workers. Yet, 
we are not going to focus on these other destinations, it is noteworthy that 
there are many other countries to which Brazilians decided to migrate. It is a 
new characteristic of the South American country once used to low levels of 
mobility. As Castles, Miller and Haas (2014) named it, they are now engaged 
in an Era of Migration that is far more complex and far more interesting.   
It is unclear how many Brazilian migrants there are, since this number relies 
on estimates and official numbers that neglect the irregular migrant. For 
instance, the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2012) has an approximation 
based on projections and calculations from official numbers, embassy and 
other diplomatic bodies’ studies, in an attempt to quantify this new reality. In 
2012, they have estimated that around 2,5mi Brazilians are outside the 
country, divided as follows: 
Table 3. Brazilian Migrants per Region 
Region Total 
North America 1.102.559 
Europa 752.132 
South America 369.040 
Asia 22.037 
Middle East 29.683 
Oceania 25.123 
Africa 16.091 
Central America and Caribbean 6.291 
Total 2.521.576 
Source: Brasil – Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2012). 
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According to Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, 2010), 
within the ten years between the previous demographic census, around 
460.000 foreigners have arrived in Brazil. If we compare this number with the 
2.5million Brazilians that are outside the country, we see a clear sign of the 
migration transition. They were distributed mainly in the states of São Paulo 
(30.0% of all international immigrants), Paraná (14.7%), Minas Gerais (9.8%), 
the Rio de Janeiro (7.6%) and Rio Grande do Sul (5.3%). 
However, these numbers can be misleading. In fact, among international 
migrants of the period, 65.6% or 174,000 individuals were Brazilians returning 
to the country. If we take a closer look at the country of origin of these 
migrants, 18% originated in the United States, 14% in Japan, 10% in 
Paraguay, followed by people from Portugal at 8%, Bolivia 6% and Spain 4%, 
which is an indication of a return migration. Yet, it is an increase in the volume 
of international migrants since the demographic census of 2000, when the 
figure was around 280.000 people. 
 
2.2 Brazilians in Portugal 
 
Both countries have long-lasting ties since the mercantile expansion that 
merged their stories into a history of colonization. As Massey et al (1998) 
points out, international migration is especially prevalent between past 
colonial powers and their former colonies because cultural, linguistic, 
investment, and many other links were established from the outset, leading to 
transnational markets and cultural systems. However, neither country had 
ever experienced such a huge flow of migrants from the former colonial side 
of the Atlantic. 
A new movement crossing the Atlantic frontier started in the 1980s, no longer 
in the same historical direction. For centuries, international migration to the 
region was the status quo. It does not imply that there was no movement 
within the country, the inequalities of labour supply and demand fostered 
many internal migration movements. But when, in the later 20th century, the 
economical difficulties were greater than a movement within borders could 
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solve, an international one was set in motion. Here, economical motives were 
extremely important as push-pull factors. 
In an attempt to create greater social mobility, Portugal arose as an option. 
Recently democratized, in a moment of economic optimism and investment, 
this country with greater quality of life than Brazil was quite tempting. With the 
deepening of globalization and the international labour market, a first wave of 
migrants starts in the 1980s – a term coined by Casa do Brasil, the main 
migrants’ association in Portugal. As already noticed (Massey, 1998; Castles 
et al, 2014), migration is a costly decision that not all can afford, especially in 
the beginning of a migratory flow. Hence, in this early stage, it was mainly 
middle- and upper-middle class Brazilians, a high skilled, and essentially 
young, workforce that left the country. Also Portuguese citizens and their 
families returning home, and even their acquaintances, make up a part of this 
profile (Peixoto, Figueiredo, 2007: 103). 
Hence, with a high demand for workers in the fields of marketing, health, and 
informatics, the market was quite open to hiring Brazilians. Sharing the same 
language was, and still is, quite beneficial for their integration in the labour 
market. In the beginning, diplomas and other academic documents were 
previously accepted without many objections. As the number was not as high 
as it is today, it is possible to say that their integration in the labour market 
was quite smooth for migrants and nationals. There was not a proper sense of 
competition between them, because Brazilians were actually filling gaps in the 
labour market and supplying a specific demand.  
When Portugal entered the CEE in 1986, millions of euros were invested in 
the country, boosting its economy and again demanding foreign workers. In 
this second wave, costs are lower, a network is being built and Portugal is 
settled as a receiving country for Brazilians. The continuous and aggravated 
economic crisis in the South American country in the early 1990s is an 
enormous pull factor towards the Southern European one, with a demand for 
workers in civil construction, telecommunications, hospitality, personal 
services and business (Pinho, 2012: 129-130). In this second wave, costs are 




Between 1986 and 1990, the GDP of Portugal grew 5,5%, whilst salaries were 
improved by 4,4%, literacy rates were higher, and infant mortality was lower 
(Amaral apud Pinho, 2012: 139). Brazil was still facing hyperinflation, 
unemployment and instability after democratization. Yet, in the middle of 
1990s, Brazilian migration rates to Portugal were less impressive than the 
previous decade. A new era in European unification, with more restrictive 
policies and more effective border control, has obstructed this flow, showing 
signs of how institutional policies were already influencing their decision. From 
1991-1998, Portuguese economic growth was showing signs of weakness, 
but international investment and more credit for construction worked as a 
cushion. 
A shift also started to take place in Brazil’s economy; with Plano Real in 1994, 
inflation was now on more palatable levels. Yet, Francisco Henrique Cardoso, 
Brazilian president at the time, could not avoid the damages of the Asian 
Crisis in 1998, with persisting unemployment, and a quite harmful 
liberalization policy privatizing important companies. Although the decade was 
nothing in comparison to the lost decade, it still ended with economic 
difficulties. 
In the second wave, a more diverse profile is displayed. A broader range of 
educational background and classes are now represented. Among with the 
previous high skilled workers, there are now workers with low levels of 
qualification, from poorer and more distant regions, who are willing to 
undertake precarious conditions in order to earn a slightly higher salary than 
they were able to command at home. It is also a moment where the 
feminization of migration becomes more evident. Although the mainstream 
image of a migrant is a young man, here in Portugal women are the principal 
group. According to Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) Report 2013, 
based on data from the previous year, there are 55.605 Brazilian women in 
Portugal. This number is the highest in comparison to any other group 
outright, female or otherwise. The second largest group is Brazilian men, with 
36.515. As domestic workers, caregivers, beauticians, and in hospitality and 
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services, women were well absorbed into the labour market. 
Although Brazilian migrants still continued to cross the Atlantic border towards 
Portugal in smaller numbers, it became a more stable flow. The attack on the 
World Trade Centre in 2001 created an atmosphere that fostered even 
greater politicization on migration and more restrictive immigration policies 
almost everywhere. Unsurprisingly, the victim nation and favourite destination 
of Brazilian migrants, the United States, has since put in place the most 
restrictive border controls. Instead of diminishing migration per se, the flow 
just adapted itself and Portugal received a part of those migrants (Pinho 2012, 
Bógus 2007). 
As opposed to the first wave, where workers could get high paid jobs 
accordingly to their qualifications, in the second one this did not happen. 
Many high skilled Brazilians had to accept jobs way below their previous ones 
or what they would expect with their résumé (Bógus, 2007; Peixoto; 
Figueiredo, 2007; Casa do Brasil, 2004). It was not the upward mobility as 
expected, but instead a downward mobility. This is especially true for irregular 
migrants.  
At this point, it is worth re-iterating the distinction between regular and 
irregular migration. All of the numbers presented here are official numbers 
and thus regarding regular migration, it is undeniable that they are distorted 
by a huge amount of people outside the formula. This is the case for Brazilian 
migrants in Portugal, and with more restrictive policies, the gap between 
official statistics and the reality of the situation widens.  
Also, there are many other agents involved in the process of integration into 
the labour market, besides the individual migrant's strategies or the 
employers’ criteria. Official institutions that revalidate their diplomas in 
Portugal can be quite obstructive, as is the case in some professions, such as 
Health and Law. Yet one of the main vehicles of labour incorporation is the 
network that has been built since they first arrived. These networks are 
responsible for channelling information, recruiting new migrants, and providing 
support. With this, the costs to them of information and adaptation are 
lowered, making the journey much more reasonable. This process diminishes 
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the importance of economic, social and psychological costs of migration. 
Massey (apud Castles et al, 2014: 40) clarifies its functioning: 
 
‘Expanding networks cause the costs of movement to fall and the 
probability of migration to rise; these trends feed off one another, and over 
time migration spreads outward to encompass all segments of society. 
This feedback occurs because the networks are created by the act of 
migration itself … Once the number of network connections in an origin 
area reach a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because 
migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it’ 
 
If, in the first wave, migrants were driven primarily by economic push-pull 
strategies, the second one sees the rise in the weight of networks. It is a less 
obvious factor in the decision making process, but it is still important. Not only 
do they ease information costs, but they also function as a network that 
advertises jobs and opportunities abroad (Padilla, 2006, p 50). Still, it is quite 
hard to assess their impact in the decision making process, but the 
connection gets clearer as the migrants become settled in Portugal. Through 
migrants associations, group meetings, and regional shops, the Brazilian 
community has a safety net that welcomes newly arrived migrants (Padilla, 
2006, Bógus, 2007: 52).  
During this second wave, an interesting treaty was signed between both 
countries. In 2000, in celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Portuguese 
discovery of Brazil, the ‘Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Consulta entre a 
República Federativa do Brasil e a República Portuguesa’ was signed. It 
allowed both Portuguese and Brazilians to enjoy a broader set of rights when 
living abroad, altering the relationship between citizenship and nationality. 
This treaty guarantees equality between some social and political rights for 
Portuguese and Brazilian citizens. Yet, it did not solve the matter of irregular 
migration between both countries and it was addressed shortly afterwards 
with another agreement. 
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There were six extraordinary periods of regularization in Portuguese history9, 
but there is one peculiarity about the regulation process that took place 
between 2003/4: it was the consequence of another bilateral agreement 
between Portugal and Brazil. The ‘Acordo Brasil - Portugal Sobre a 
Contratação Recíproca de Nacionais’ popularly referred to as the ‘Acordo 
Lula’, is another proof of a sort of positive discrimination towards these 
migrants. To us, it was not a coincidence that in 2007 (SEF 2007) Brazilians 
surpassed the amount of Cape Verdeans to become the most important 
supply of migrants, with 15% of the migration population. If economic factors 
were not as strong as they once were, and networks have been long 
established, there is more to this increase. It is a sign of the importance 
gained by the third variable of the liberal state thesis, Rights.  
 
2.3 Statute of Equality 
 
As Zolberg (1981: 20) points out, with the third wave of democratization the 
right to exit one’s own country as prescribed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is finally respected. However, the problem remains with the 
right to enter another country and is in this deviant character of migration that 
the tension between the interests of individuals and the interests of societies 
can collapse. The same is true between the interests of the receiving and 
sending country, each of which regulates migration in accordance with goals 
of its own.  
In order to harmonize rights between both countries and alleviate possible 
tensions, the ‘Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Consulta entre a República 
Federativa do Brasil e a República Portuguesa’  was signed in 22 April 2000 
in Porto Seguro, revoking previous treaties10. Date and place were not a 
coincidence, rather a celebration of the 500th anniversary of Brazil’s 
‘discovery’, making it hard to neglect that colonial ties are very important to 
this migration flow. Its first article invokes many centuries of friendship 
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  They happened in 1992, 1996, 2001, 2003/4, 2005 and 2007 (Padilla; Ortiz 2012: 168).	  
10	  Resolução da Assembléia da República n.º 83/2000.	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between both countries, praising their commitment to foster each others 
economic, social and cultural development founded on respect of fundamental 
rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the principle of democratic organization of society and the state, and the 
search for greater and broader social justice.  
This one article brings together two important aspects of migration today, its 
relation with rights and democracy. It is because we are dealing with two 
democratic countries that are bounded by many treaties under international 
law, that the on-going debate in this work can exist. The human rights regime 
deals with the idea of personhood and not in terms of national belonging and 
is, therefore, in regards to migrants as well, expanding their rights. 
International human rights did not became significant only because of 
normative concerns, rather human rights codes became a mechanism 
through which states could respond to changing structural conditions and 
challenges (Jacobson, 1997: 74) 
The treaty states that, in order to promote cooperation and consultation, 
presidential and diplomatic meetings will be held, along with other summits. It 
emphasizes the role that both countries have as two ends of a bridge between 
the European Union and Mercosul. It also binds them to hold yearly summits 
on foreign affairs. The treaty was signed under the second term of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso's presidency, at a point in time in during which Brazil was 
starting to show comparatively strong signs of recovery from the economic 
crisis that had occurred in the previous decade. Thus, a better relationship 
with Portugal was extremely important for the purpose of opening channels of 
contact with the European country from various perspectives. Likewise, the 
same was true for Portugal in Latin America. The treaty also stipulates about 
commercial trade, investments, financial and economic cooperation and other 
economical matters.  
In terms of social and cultural development, it postulates that both countries 
should promote each other's cultural heritage, academic exchange between 
students and professors, and scholarships. Also, it provides that diplomas and 
other educational certificates should be validated on easier terms. In an 
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attempt to diminish another obstacle to the labour market, it sets forth that 
both Brazilians and Portuguese should enjoy the requirement of the same 
conditions regarding access to job opportunities as nationals. 
Yet, within its many provisions, we will focus on the Chapter Two, Title II: 
‘Estatuto da Igualdade’11. This Statute is a great example of how, through 
specific legislation on immigration and law, States are able to grant benefits to 
citizens of certain countries with which there is some historical and cultural 
affinity (Padilla; Silva, 2012: 176). Countries such as Portugal and Spain try to 
do so in order to ease restrictive policies under the European Union and the 
Schengen Agreement. The signature of this treaty is already a symptom of 
how the increase in Brazilian emigration, especially from the 1980s, has 
stimulated changes in the Brazilian state’s relationship itself, either with 
receiving countries or its diaspora. Because of Brazil’s privileged place in this 
dynamic and its present recognition as an economic power, we can expect 
that international exchanges and the importance of migratory flows will 
continue to grow (Padilla; Silva, 2012: 176). 
Its first article provides for equal rights and obligations between Brazilians in 
Portugal and Portuguese in Brazil. It does not imply that they will be 
naturalized, rather that they will keep their nationalities and yet bear the same 
rights as nationals of the country of residency. Actually, according to article 
16, once they are naturalized they are no longer under this treaty. Its objective 
is to grant rights to migrants that are regularly and currently living in each 
country. However, it is not an automatic provision, residents willing to be 
under the provisions of the Statute should notify authorities in their respective 
country of residency. 
Article 17 sets forth that both can enjoy the same political rights as nationals 
in the country of residency. Yet, they need to have been living regularly in the 
country for the last three years to enjoy that set of rights. Article 18 states that, 
once they are under the Statute’s provisions, they will be judged according to 
the penal code of the country of residence. Therefore, they cannot be 
extradited to any other country besides their home nation. Yet, if they leave 
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the country of residence, they will only be entitled to the diplomatic protection 
afforded by the latter. It is noteworthy that the Statute guarantees equal legal 
rights within borders, in a sort of semi-citizenship status (Castles; Davidson, 
2000).  
Hence, it represents a middle ground between classification as an alien and 
as a national or naturalized citizen. The Statute of Equality between Brazil and 
Portugal is a legal innovation resulting from a bilateral treaty, which adjusts 
the classical notion of nationality as a necessary prerequisite of citizenship. In 
the sense that it enables, saving an unscathed bond of nationality with one of 
the two countries, the individual pass to practice in another state, inherent 
rights as a citizen (Rezek apud Ribeiro, 2014: 104). 
As Igor Machado (2012: 313) points out, the substantial legislative activity in 
Portugal in regards to controlling migration is an indication of how the intensity 
of the flows has challenged convictions about nationality and distilled feelings 
of apprehension and resistance. Furthermore, it shows that the type of 
relationship between the nation states from which emigrants leave and the 
one it enters is crucially influential to the conduct of the receiving state 
towards these migrants. Machado is even more emphatic in saying that these 
are laws of assimilation based on a constant refusal of difference, being a 
case of a colonial spirit advancing beyond the colonial history, a sort of 
conquest at the level of identity.  
Castles and Davidson (2000: 9) emphasize that, in the case of migrants from 
former colonies, the culture of the Other partially mirrors that of the receiving 
society, yet the dialectical unity of exploiter and exploited contains a 
fundamental difference in experience. Hence, they may be assimilated 
through easier legal regulations, as they are not seen as different from 
nationals. In another perspective, Soysal (1994: 41-42) defends that global 
pressure towards the expansion of individual rights has lead to the increasing 
incorporation of foreigners into existing membership structures, diminishing 
the importance of national citizenship. Thus, the long-lasting ties that 
configure the relationship between former colonial powers and former 
colonies are also amplified by international demands on human rights.  
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Moreover, European Union citizenship itself can be seen as a case of quasi-
citizenship, as it does confer significant rights on the nationals of one member 
state living within another, without configuring full citizenship (Castles; 
Davidson, 2000: 98). EU citizenship does not separate citizenship from 
national belonging, but creates a two-level model in which supranational rights 
are dependent on national belonging at the member-state level (Castles; 
Davidson, 2000: 98). Still, it does not confer political participation, which the 
Statute of Equality does. 
Although Brazilian migrants in Portugal are national of a third state for the 
European Union, they are simultaneously nationals under privileged treaties. 
It minimizes the distance between nationals and migrants, in the case of this 
specific group. It even allows them to have a similar identity card to the one 
that a Portuguese citizen holds, between which the only difference being the 
fact that it is indicating another nationality and the Treaty that established this 
possibility. It is undeniably a pull factor, but this time in terms of rights. 
Through this bilateral agreement Brazilians are positively discriminated in 
relation to other groups, granting more equal rights and a less marginalized 
position.  
However, this is only true for regular migrants. As we have stressed, all the 
numbers we are dealing with can be misleading for not counting 
undocumented migrants. But for politics they are the ones that matter the 
most, either for their quest for control or in an attempt to regularize their status 
through exceptional measures. The latter is the case when it comes to 
Brazilians in Portugal and in 2003 another crucial bilateral agreement was 
signed.  
 
2.4 Acordo Brasil-Portugal Sobre a Contratação Recíproca de Nacionais  
 
The dilemmas of control are especially notable in advanced industrial 
economies that deal with two opposing forces, where economic pressures 
push for a liberalization of migration while political, legal and security 
concerns push for more restrictive policies (Hollifield et al, 2014). In the 
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case of the European Union this dilemma is more acute; on one hand its 
future depends on successfully framing new inclusive models of citizenship 
and broader forms of solidarity, whilst; on the other hand, doing so implies 
battling powerful political forces (Soysal, 1994: 7).  
In an era of unprecedented international labour, the efficacy of immigration 
controls is undermined by the prevailing demand of labour-importing countries 
in an era of globalization (Sassen, 1996: 51). There is a structural demand for 
foreign workers in some sectors, such as agriculture, construction, health 
care, domestic help, and hospitality. Thus, they will continue to hire workers, 
regardless of whether they are documented or not, resulting in a widening gap 
between immigration policy goals and outcomes (Hollifield et al, 2014: 15).  
Throughout recent decades, the increase on irregular migration has led to 
extraordinary regularization processes in many countries, including former 
and current recipients of immigration. Portugal is not an exception, there were 
some extraordinary regularization processes until today: 
Table 4. Extraordinary Regularization Processes in Portugal 
Process Migrants Regularized Specificities 
1992 - 1993 16.000 39.000 applicants, mainly 
from Cape Verde and Angola 1996 30.000 35.000 applicants, mainly 
from PALOP 2001  183.833 Eastern European, Brazilians 
and Others 2003 13.998 30.000 applicants – 16.173 
Extension of Permanence 
Exclusively Brazilians 
2004 - 50.196 applications – 3.019 
Extension of Permanence Source: Beatriz Padilla, 2007: 217. 
 
Although all of these processes are extraordinary and conform to the same 
logic: regularizing migrants in an attempt to diminish the gap between border 
control policies and its outcomes, one is quite particular. In 2003, a bilateral 
agreement, Acordo Brasil-Portugal Sobre a Contratação Recíproca de 
Nacionais or Acordo Lula, has set an extraordinary process exclusively for 
Brazilians12. It was the first time that a bilateral agreement motivated an 
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  Decree n.º 40/2003, 19 September, 2003.	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extraordinary regularization process and the first time that it was exclusive to 
only one group of migrants (Padilla, 2012: 186). It derived from the Tratado da 
Amizade, Cooperação and Consulta discussed in the previous subchapter, 
along with two other bilateral agreements, Acordo Sobre a Facilitação da 
Circulação de Pessoas13 and Acordo Sobre a Cooperação Para a Prevenção 
e Repressão do Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes14. Thus, we will briefly discuss the 
latter two before we address the particularities of the 2003 extraordinary 
process.  
The Acordo Sobre a Facilitação da Circulação de Pessoas establishes that 
citizens of one country visiting the other for a period of 90 days do not require 
a visa, solely for artistic, cultural, scientific, business, academic internship, 
journalistic, sports or tourism purposes. It clearly excludes the possibility of 
doing any professional activity under this provision. A few days earlier, on 20 
September 2003, the Acordo Sobre a Cooperação Para a Prevenção e 
Repressão do Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes  was signed. Its main objective is to 
exchange experiences, informations, and other means of cooperation to 
prevent and control human trafficking, as set in its 1st article. According to 
Filipa Pinho (2012), these agreements allow us to affirm that they are 
instruments of framing the development of Brazilian immigration, both in terms 
of size and composition, in an attempt to deepen their integration. If it did not 
address workers, it would be missing the most important share of this 
migrant’s community. 
Thus, we turn to the agreement that has dealt with this concern and also 
opened the possibility of the 2003 extraordinary procedure. When it comes to 
agreements, reading only its articles might not be enough to understand the 
whole context that it encompasses. So, a look to its preparation process might 
shed a light to help us understand its outcome. It was signed in the first year 
of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva's first mandate, in a moment where Brazil 
recognized the importance of a dialogue with its nationals abroad, as well as 
its impact on foreign policies. Curiously, social media and migrants 
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  Decree n.º 43/2003, 24 September, 2003.	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  Decree n.º 40/2003, 20 September, 2003.	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themselves re-baptized the Agreement as ‘Acordo Lula’, such was the 
importance of this new moment.  
It was a moment where the Brazilian government established a closer 
dialogue with its diaspora abroad, assuming its size and importance. Lula 
signed a letter to Brazilians far from home (“Carta aos Brasileiros Longe de 
Casa”) during his electoral campaign in 2002, showing his interest in closing 
this gap between the State and its emigrants even before he was elected. 
After his victory, there was an immense investment in foreign policy. The 
international agenda becomes strategic: more embassies were open, more 
diplomatic visits were made, and many bilateral agreements were signed. 
Migration then gained a new weight in Brazil’s foreign policy.  
However, this new channel of dialogue did not appear purely as a result of 
presidential and diplomatic efforts alone. It was only possible due to the active 
role of Casa do Brasil, the most important Brazilian migrants association in 
Portugal. They have worked on many studies about the situation of Brazilian 
migration, becoming recognized by ACIME and working together on previous 
occasions. In regards to this Agreement, they had maintained contact and 
meetings with the Brazilian government, both with the legislature and some 
Ministries, reporting the livelihood of migrants in Portugal. So, a bicameral 
committee held a visit to Portugal, hosting a dialogue between Portuguese 
authorities and the Brazilian community. It was only following this cooperative 
work that the Agreement was signed (Padilla, 2007: 219).  
On 19 September 2003, it was signed and executed as an important 
instrument for Brazilian migrants living in Portugal irregularly to have their 
status regularized, providing that they were in possession of an employment 
contract. Yet, it did not openly state the extraordinary process itself. 
‘Conscious of the need to facilitate the movement of their nationals for the 
provision of work’, the Agreement legislates on the labour market for both 
Portuguese in Brazil and Brazilians in Portugal. Among its articles family 
reunification, remittances, and visa procedures are mentioned. In a quite 




“1. Nationals of both Signatory States will be issued appropriate visas, 
under the legislation in force in the receiving State.  
2. The fact that a national of one of the Contracting States is in the 
territory of the other Contracting State at the date of signature of this 
Agreement is considered special reason for accepting a visa in a consular 
office outside of the area of residence, as long as that individual is there in 
a legal status, thus regularizing that individual's stay in the Contracting 
State in which he is located.” 
 
Through an unorthodox procedure, it opens a breach for an extraordinary 
process of regularization. The process, later revealed by Portuguese 
authorities in 25 August 2003, can be described in three steps (Padilla, 2007: 
220- 221): 
Step 1: With a letter of SEF’s notice, the migrant should apply for an 
extension of stay, proving that entered Portugal before 11 July (date of the 
agreement’s signature). At the time of extending the stay in Portugal, the 
migrant would then have to pay fines/fees for two different reasons: for 
irregular stay in the country (87 – 700 euros), and each extension of 90 days 
stay. 
Step 2: Once the visa extending the stay was obtained, the migrants’ 
employer should submit its contract, along with a series of requirements and 
documentary evidence about the worker and the company itself. This 
requirement shows an intention on the behalf of the Portuguese State to 
achieve greater transparency in labour markets, demanding compliance with 
various regulations, such as tax obligations, safety and industrial hygiene, as 
conditions to validate the desired employment contract. 
Step 3: With the extension of the stay and the assent of the General 
Inspectorate of Labour, the migrant should schedule a visit to one of 
Portugal's consulates in Spain: Seville, Vigo, or Madrid, for the request of a 
work permit, using the Schengen form. Along with other documents, such as 
passport, criminal record, both Portugal as the country of origin, and a 




 At a cursory glance over the procedure, we can anticipate a few certain 
obstacles to the regularization process. The most obvious one is the unclear 
amount of fines that the migrant would have to pay, an amount that for many 
migrants could not be paid. Irregular migrants are much more penalized by 
their status in the labour market than migrants, who are in turn already dealing 
with precarious conditions. When the possibility of being fined 700 euros is at 
stake, many of them would discard this idea and continue to stay and work 
illegally. 
Another issue is the requirement of a contract (Marmora apud Padilla, 2007: 
222), maybe an important requirement from the perspective of legitimizing the 
process before nationals, it might end up spiralling into a vicious circle. 
Employment would lead to a visa, but failing to get a job would render them 
irregular migrants once more. It is not the optimal solution, but it was a 
precondition for the possibility of securing the extraordinary process between 
both countries. Additionally, the best guarantee for the rights of migrants and 
the negative impacts that can be produced in societies of origin and arrival are 
bilateral treaties that allow their regulation (Marmora apud Pinho, 2012). 
Although this process was beneficial for our group of study, it is undeniably 
discriminatory towards other migrant communities, as it was created through a 
bilateral agreement only between Portugal and Brazil. It is comprehensible 
that other migrants associations and individuals pressured the government, 
not in the sense to play against the agreement itself, but rather to guarantee 
something similar. Thus, in 2004, another extraordinary process was enacted, 
this time without any nationality requirements. Yet, other requirements were 









Chapter Three – Case Study: Liberal State thesis and Brazilian Migration 
to Portugal between 2003 and 2013 
 
Regulating international migration requires liberal states to be attentive to 
the (human or civil) rights of the individual – if those rights are ignored or 
trampled on, the liberal state risks undermining its own legitimacy and 
raison d’être.  
(Hollifield et al, 2014: 26) 
 
We have decided to focus on the years between 2003 and 2013 for a number 
of reasons that ought to be highlighted. One of those goes beyond our control 
and has to deal with the data that is available to us. The 2014 report uses 
data from the previous year and, although we could use some estimations for 
2014, we have decided not to. Yet, we have decided to go back to 2003 
because a time span of ten years not only seems suitable, but plausible. 
Official data from that period is highly accurate and there are enough reports 
available to conduct our research. We will principally be using data from 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), World Bank (WB) SEF, and IBGE15. 
A second reason is the importance of the last decade and how it has added a 
lot more to the question. In 2003, ‘Acordo Lula’ was signed (see subchapter 
2.4), a bilateral agreement acknowledging the large population of irregular 
Brazilians living and working in Portugal, thus leading to an extraordinary – 
and exclusive – regularization process. Although it was one of the agreements 
deriving from the ‘Tratado de Amizade’, from which the ‘Estatuto da 
Igualdade’ also derives, which was signed in 2000, and we are not going 
further than 2003 in our analysis, we will address their impact upon the 
following years which are pertinent to our time frame. Altogether, the ‘Estatuto 
da Igualdade’ and ‘Acordo Lula’ have marked this last decade in terms of 
rights for Brazilian migrants. It was not a coincidence that the number of 
Brazilians surpassed the amount of Cape Verdeans in Portugal in 2007 (SEF, 
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  The fragility, in terms of numbers, when we address migration is extremely high; it is not an 
easy phenomenon to measure. Even when we deal with official numbers, which is the case, 
we neglect a vast swathe of irregular migrants who are off the books. So, we have decided to 
assume this fragility before we even starting to present further numbers, in order to keep in 
mind that we are discussing a fraction of the question: regular migrants.	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2007) to become the most important sending country, with 15% of the 
migration population. 
Also, one year earlier, a new piece of legislation governing nationality was set 
forth in Portugal, Lei de Nacionalidade16. It no longer includes a positive 
discrimination towards Portuguese speaking countries, legislating that all 
migrants that have been legally residing in Portugal for the last six years and 
have a basic knowledge of Portuguese can appeal for their naturalization. 
Before that, migrants from Portuguese speaking countries could request it 
after six years and other nationals after ten. So, it solved this differentiation, 
making it easier for all groups. This new legislation also has its transnational 
trait, having absorbed a lot from EU legislation on migration. In an attempt to 
harmonize both the national and transnational legislation, it had to absorb a 
set of human rights provisions. But it also brought with it a high level of 
securitization, which was even reinforced with a new amendment to the law in 
2012. 
Apart from the rights-based discussion, there have been some changes in the 
push-pull factors between both countries. Portugal got caught in an 
international crisis that deteriorate its attractive factors, for both migrants and 
nationals. Since 2008, economic factors have been too unappealing for a 
new, high influx of migrants. In fact, there has been a steady decrease in 
numbers since 2010. Brazil, on the other hand, had some important 
successful years economically from 2003 until 2013. During the international 
economic crisis, the country was able to avoid its effects for a while and a 
return of its diaspora started to occur. Furthermore, nationals decided to 
emigrate, a reminder that the country itself never stopped being a sending 
country itself. From 2011 until today, the net migration rate has been negative 
(INE, several years).  
That is the reason why we will focus on these ten years, trying to further 
unfold the main changes that we have highlighted above. First, we will 
analyse the migrant flow, along with economic data from both countries, in 
order to assess the economic variable. Secondly, we will briefly discuss the 
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work of networks into fostering this migration flow. Then, we will turn to the 
rights-based approach, analysing the impact of naturalization and the new 
Portuguese legislation.  
 
3.1 Economic Variable 
 
In order to assess the economic context within the ten-year period, we have 
decided to use the following indexes: the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate per year, the unemployment rate, Gini coefficient and purchasing 
power parity. As any other arbitrary choice, it also has its limitations, but we 
have considered that they are a simple illustration of the economic changes 
that both countries faced between 2003 and 2013. Thus, they will work better 
as a picture of the economic context of both countries in a single image that 
can be compared year on year.  
Furthermore, in order to facilitate our analysis, have we decided to divide this 
time span into three separate phases. The first phase goes from 2003 until 
2006, an attractive moment for Brazilians to migrate due to a more favourable 
economic scenario in Portugal. The second goes from 2007 until 2010, a time 
in which Brazilians became the most important migrant group, reaching its 
migration peak in its last year. Our last phase corresponds to the final three 
years, during which an economic recession in Portugal is severe while Brazil 
experiences a positive economic turn.  
Our first comparative picture between both countries shows a scenario in 
which push-pull factors attracting Brazilians to Portugal are undeniably high. 
The presidential mandate of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, which opted to maintain 
the macroeconomic approach of its predecessor, began in 2003. His 
government continued the liberal reforms (Druck; Filgueiras apud Pinho, 
2012: 142), with the objective of maintaining the anti-inflationary policy. 
Although there was still some fragility in the Brazilian economy, it was by not 
nearly as severe as the ‘lost decade’ had been.  Even so, there was a high 
level of unemployment, combined with a low rate of growth and an 
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environment of uncertainty amidst the market due to the president's left-wing 
inclination.   
During these four years of our first phase, although unemployment rates in 
Brazil decreased, they remained higher than that of Portugal, as we can see 
in the Figure 2. However, it is interesting to note that if we compare Brazil’s 
unemployment rate with the unemployment rate for migrants in Portugal, the 
scenario is slightly different. Due to a segmented labour market and the 
difficulties of incorporation into the labour market for migrants (Peixoto; 
Figueiredo, 2007; Baganha et al, 1999), their unemployment rates are a bit 
higher. Only in 2003 the unemployment rate in Brazil was higher, being 
supplanted in the following year. Still, from 2003 until 2006 they are similar 
enough to avoid becoming a repulsion factor for these migrants. 
Figure 2. Unemployment in Brazil and Portugal 2003 - 2006 
 













2003 2004 2005 2006 
Portugal 6,2% 6,4% 7,7% 7,8% 
Brazil 12,4% 11,5% 9,9% 10,0% 
Migrants in Portugal 11,3% 13,2% 12,2% 11,2% 
Portugal Brazil Migrants in Portugal 
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Figure 3. GDP Growth in Brazil and Portugal 2003 - 2006 
 
Source: INE and IBGE (several years), produced by author.  
 
Nevertheless, the GDP Growth from both countries between 2003 and 2006 
(Figure 3) is the first sign that there was an economic transition underway in 
Brazil. After a rough start to the first year of Lula’s mandate and the austerity 
of the FMI program, all the following years experienced high levels of GDP 
growth. There were prosperous years for the South American economy, but it 
was not equally distributed.  
According to the World Bank GINI estimate, Brazil has extreme inequality, 
with a coefficient higher than 50 (in a scale of 0 to 100) until today. So, 
although the country witnessed economic growth, this nevertheless did not 
change its pattern of exclusion and poverty. In 2003, the Gini coefficient was 
58 and by 2006 it had slightly decreased to 55,9. During the same period, 
Portugal’s Gini coefficient went from 37,8 to 36,8 (INE). Also, when we 
compare the Purchasing Power Parity between both countries (Figure 4), 
disparities in the cost of living are illustrated17.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  It is importante to explain that we have decided to use the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
instead of wage differentials. As we could not specifically translate wage differentials in other 
terms using the minimum wage as an adequate tool of analysis, the PPP helps us to 
illustrate, so that we can understand the real value of Money in both countries in correlation to 





























Figure 4. Purchasing Power Parity 2003 - 2006 
 
Source: World Bank (several years), produced by author.  
 
Brazil, therefore, faced a high unemployment rate, high inequality and an 
increase in the cost of living in comparison with Portugal. Apart from GDP 
growth, Portugal presented better numbers in all three indexes. Therein we 
find a part of the explanation for Brazilian migration to Portugal in these years. 
By 2006, Brazilians are the second biggest migrant community, with just 
twenty-two fewer regular residents than Cape Verde, the largest. As we can 
see in Figure 5 below, their proportion in comparison to Portugal’s total 
foreign population has increased sharply over the last two years. As we have 
discussed in subchapter 2.4, two extraordinary regulation processes 
happened in the meanwhile (2003, exclusive for Brazilians, and 2004, for all 
nationalities), which have also put back many migrants in the official counting. 






















Figure 5. Brazilian Population in Comparison to Total Migrants 
Population 2003 - 2013 
 
Source: SEF (several years), produced by author.  
Next, in the following year, Brazil becomes the biggest sending country to 
Portugal, making up 15.23% of the total population. From 2007 until 2009 
there was a steady increase in the number of migrants, which does not 
exclude other migrant groups as well, but the growth rate was higher in the 
Brazilian community. This second phase sees an economic change in both 
countries. Brazil, on one hand, maintained its high GDP growth rates, but also 
lowered unemployment. Portugal, on the other, could sustain neither its GDP 
growth nor its employment rate. 
As we can see in the Unemployment and GDP figures below, in 2008, there 
was a reverse in this trend. There was an upturn in the Brazilian economy 
coupled with a downturn in that of Portugal. Unemployment rates were similar 
for the first time, and even lower in the following years until today. With the 
deepening of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the United States Recession, 
there was a spill over in the foreign market that hit Portugal more severely 
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Brazil’s unemployment rate continued to fall, which was not the case in 
Portugal. In terms of purchasing power parity, the trend of a higher cost of 
living in Brazil is maintained, as we can see in Figure 8.   
Figure 6. Unemployment in Brazil and Portugal 2007 - 2010 
 
Source: INE and IBGE (several years), produced by author.  
Figure 7. GDP Growth 2007 - 2010 
 













2007 2008 2009 2010 
Portugal 8,1% 7,7% 9,6% 11,0% 
Brazil 9,3% 7,9% 8,1% 6,7% 
Migrants in Portugal 12,0% 10,9% 16,5% 18,8% 



























Figure 8. Purchasing Power Parity 2007 - 2010 
 
Source: World Bank (several years), produced by author.  
In our opinion, 2010 is the most interesting year for the understanding of 
Brazilian migration to Portugal in the 21st century. It holds many contradicting 
features, where attraction factors to Portugal should be undeniably lower – as 
it already is for many other groups of migrants – but the amount of regular 
Brazilian migrants reaches its historical peak.  
In that year, the unemployment rate for migrants in Portugal was three times 
higher than the same in Brazil. This is possibly a sign not only that 
incorporation into the labour market had become harder, but it is also most 
likely that working conditions had also deteriorated, as had previously 
happened in the 1973 Oil Crisis with migrants in France and Germany 
(Hollifield, 1992, Massey, 1998; Brubaker 1992), for example.  At the same 
time, GPD growth was almost four times lower in the Iberian country. Hence, 
migration stock decreased 1,97% and the effects of the economic crisis (SEF, 
2010) and the net migration rate is at a historical minimum, 3,8% (INE, 
several years), the lowest it has been since 1993 but the highest since that 
year until today.  
From the point of view of neoclassical theories, push-pull factors would not 
perpetuate the movement of Brazilians, as an aggravated economic context 
that started in 2008 showed no signs of improvement. Although it probably 
changed the course of decision of many migrants, in that year the number of 
migrants set records: 26,81% of the total migrant population, 119.363. When 
compared to Portugal’s population, they represented 1,13% of the total. This 
number is even bigger if we remind ourselves that the migrant stock does 
1,16 1,23 
1,31 1,4 










not includes those migrants who have acquired Portuguese nationality, which 
is the case for many Brazilians and will be addressed later in the chapter.  
This suggests that migrants are not only driven by economic factors and that 
they might even take risks in moments of crisis that cannot be easily 
explained simply by looking at numbers. Their plans might involve the 
reunification of a family separated by circumstance, following a loved one who 
has left their country, or even women's emancipation, as already pointed by 
other studies (See Finotelli et al 2013; Pinho, 2012). It is hard to generalize 
what their motivations may have been, but we should not assume that there 
are insufficient reasons outside of the rational economical decision-making 
process that might foster this transatlantic movement. Rather, it implies that 
migratory flows may respond in a slower pace to a decrease in the market 
demand due to other attraction factors. Conversely, Finotelli et al (2013: 140), 
includes other variables in the analysis for this period: 
 
“The maintenance of an intense migratory growth appears to be linked to 
the strength of migratory networks between Brazil and Portugal; the 
expectations about entering the country and later regulating their situation, 
which was reinforced the designated Lula Agreement (Agreement between 
the Portuguese Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil on National 
Reciprocal Procurement), in 2003; and the type of economic integration of 
migrants, mainly related to services, less feeling the impacts of the 
economic downturn than other foreigners. For, in addition, the Brazilians 
were among those who benefited most from the settlement of rights granted 
by the 2007 immigration law - which explains the increase in their number 
after 2008 (representing mostly entries in previous years). The impact of the 
recession subsequent to 2008 is, however, remarkable, which explains the 
contraction after 2010.” (Translated by author) 
 
Hence, the rough years that Portugal had been facing economically did not 
immediately put migrants’ projects to an end, although it changed the scenario 
for the following years. From 2011 until 2013, Portugal remained tangled up in 
crisis, and migration continued to decrease while emigration rose. The net 
emigration rate was negative during these three years, -24,3% in 2011, -
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37,3% in 2012, and  -36,2% in 2013 (INE, several years).  
The persistence of low growth rates (Figure 9) combined with high 
unemployment (Figure 10) is undeniably one of the main reasons for nationals 
to decide to leave the country, as well as for migrants. The particularity for 
migrants is that it not only means a moment of return to their country, but also 
further migration to other countries or even the end of migration plans to 
Portugal, ceasing a potential migration flow. The disparity between nationals’ 
unemployment and migrants’ unemployment has widened even further. 
Figure 9. GDP Growth 2011 - 2013 
 
Source: INE and IBGE (several years), produced by author.  
Figure 10. Unemployment in Brazil and Portugal 2011 - 2013 
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In the sending country, growth rates were not as high as they had been during 
the previous years that we have discussed; yet they were seeing 
improvement. Brazil maintained a sustainable growth until 2013, and kept the 
trend of lowering unemployment rates. Once more, the purchasing parity 
power shows the effects of a high cost of living in Brazil, as we can see in 
Figure 11. Along with the Gini coefficient, which to date has also not left the 
extreme inequality group with more than 50 points, these two economic 
indicators were the least favourable in the South American country. 
Figure 11. Purchasing Power Parity 2011 - 2013 
 
Source: World Bank (several years), produced by author.  
Unemployment in 2013 reached almost a third of migrants in Portugal, which 
brought about other consequences than the decision to leave the country 
(Figure 10). As visa requirements are normally attached to a working contract, 
it means that these unemployed migrants would reach a dilemma: either 
continue here illegally or leave the country in the quest for better 
opportunities. Thus, it is plausible to expect a rise in illegal migrants during 
these years, which can be partially reflected in the official numbers we are 
dealing with.  
As segmented labour market theory predicts, migrants are mainly hired to fulfil 
jobs in which domestic workers are not interested or for which they are not 
requested. In the case of Brazilian migrants, they are mainly found in 
hospitality, services, restaurants, and civil construction (Finotelli et al, 2013: 
32). These areas were also hit by the economic crisis, leading to their high 
unemployment rate. Thus, informality becomes an easy and quick answer to 
the difficulties in being incorporated into the labour market, but it comes with 
1,47 1,52 1,61 











the price of precarious working conditions (Finotelli et al, 2013: 155). With 
push-pull factors in such a different scenario, by the end of 2013, neither the 
bottom nor the peak of their historical migration flow was reached, but 
somewhere in between.  
According to the latest available report from SEF, in our last year of analysis, 
there were 92.120 regular Brazilian migrants in the country. In this year, the 
decrease of 13.502 regular Brazilians migrants represented 85,9% of the total 
decrease in Portugal's migrant community. However, this number still 
represents 23% of the total migrant population, remaining as the main 
sending country by a good margin – Cape Verde is the second, with 11%, and 
Ukraine is the third, with 10%. As we can see Figure 12, their share in 
Portugal’s migration stock remains impressive: 
Figure 12. Brazilian Population in Comparison to Total Migrants 
Population 
 
Source: SEF (several years), produced by author.  
Consequently, the number of Brazilians who persisted in their migration 
projects cannot be ignored; they are still the biggest community in recent 
Portuguese immigration history. So, our last year of analysis ends with the 
Brazilian community representing a strong share of the migrants population. 
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population in the same year, representing 0,9% of it. Hence, understanding 
other factors that may explain their persistence is crucial for deepening our 
comprehension of the matter. Our next variable of analysis is migrant 
networks that transnationally link ties between both countries, sustaining this 
migratory flow even in times of crisis.  
 
3.2 The valuable importance of networks 
	  
	  
Saskia Sassen (1996: 34) argues that there are two main mechanisms that 
bind immigration countries to emigration countries, one is a past colonial or 
neo-colonial bond, the other is the economic links brought about by the 
internationalization of the market. The third type of link that the author lists is 
the organized recruitment of workers, which can be effected either directly by 
the government or through kinship and family networks. In this world of 
intense globalization, the movement of ideas, aspirations and people is 
increasingly fast, which poses difficulties to the old conceptualization of the 
nation state. Large-scale international migrations are conditioned and 
structured within complex economic, social, and ethnic networks a national 
state may have the power to write the text of an immigration policy, but it is 
likely to be dealing with complex, transnational processes that it can only 
partly address (Sassen 1996: 34). 
Migrants themselves perpetuate the flow, bringing their spouses, children, 
siblings, and a further array of social networks. The question of access to the 
territories, labour markets, and welfare systems of the world’s favoured states 
is decisive for persons and states alike (Brubaker, 1992: 181). Believing that 
networks are by no means decisive would be an underestimation. Although 
they are not the one and only variable, they are vital connections between a 
potential migrant and the receiving country. Thus, they function in a process 
that makes migration a lot more attractive: 
 
“Migrants are inevitably linked to non-migrants, and the latter draw upon 
obligations implicit in relationships such as kinship and friendship to 
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gain access to employment and assistance at the point of destination. (…) 
When migrant networks are well developed, they but a destination job 
within easy reach of most community members and make immigration a 
reliable and secure source of income. Thus, the growth of networks that 
occur through the progressive reduction of costs may also be explained 
theoretically by the progressive reduction of risks. Every new migrant 
expands the network and reduces the risks of movement for all those to 
whom he or she is related, eventually making it virtually risk-free and 
costless to diversify household labour allocations through emigration.” 
(Massey et al, 1998: 50)  
 
We can use the example of the 'guest worker' immigration system that took 
place after the Second World War. Once the economic crisis hit Europe in 
1973 and states tried to simply withdraw their invitation to the continent, they 
found that it was neither possible nor plausible. According to Hollifield et al 
(2014: 18), these transnational social networks, perhaps more than any other 
factor, helped to sustain migration reunification in Europe and irregular 
migration from Mexico to the United States during periods of uncertainty 
regarding the labour market.  
Hence, networks are even more important when the risks are higher, such as 
economic crises, because they work as a safeguard not only for potential 
migrants but also for migrants themselves. In a market of increasing 
informality and fragility, these ties can more easily organize labour demand 
and workers. Yet, it is quite difficult to precisely assess the role of networks for 
the totality of Brazilian migrants, which this work would not be able to do. So 
we have accepted a more humble task of dealing with previous works in the 
matter and, in some cases, the interviews they have conducted. Later we will 
map Brazilian migrants associations in Portugal that are recognised by the 
government through the High Commissariat on Migration. 
In Filipa Pinho's work (2012), 23 interviews with Brazilian migrants are 
analysed. These are migrants who came to Portugal between 1998 and 2005, 
who were either unemployed or working in the third sector, civil construction 
and restaurants, areas in which Brazilians are generally well-represented. 
When questioned about what information they had at the time, what were the 
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push-pull factors and whether they had known somebody in Portugal, the 
answers are quite interesting.  
They were not well informed about the labour market nor wage differentials, 
as neoclassical thinking would suggest, rather they had little positive feedback 
from other migrants. The attraction factors were less explicit to them then the 
repulsion factors, such as unemployment, debt, and violence. These are, of 
course, factors that we have already mention as potential repellents in the 
previous section. But there were other motives, such as family issues, family 
reunion, and also a reorientation of the migratory flow towards the United 
States. Amongst the interviewees, only two students arrived in Portugal with 
the adequate visa, while the others entered the country as tourists and then 
proceeded to regularize their documents.  
While they all had different paths that should not be generalized, there was 
one thing that they all had in common: someone they knew had provided ties, 
being herself or himself migrants in Portugal. There were weaker and stronger 
ties, as expected, but they existed to some extent. Even when the promised 
help did not occur, or the ties were lost once the new migrant arrived, they all 
remember this connection as being an important part of their decision-making 
process. They could not be entirely aware of the economic variables, but the 
simple fact that they had known someone who had made this same 
transatlantic journey had stimulated them to follow the same path. 
Although we are talking about migrants networks and not social networks, 
they do work as tools for migrants to access information, colleagues or 
relatives in another country. Thus, their importance has grown a lot in the last 
decade. The technological revolution brought about with globalization has 
showed no indications of stopping, and now is even more affordable and 
spread out than it ever was. Hence, it strengthens migrant networks by 
offering cheaper and faster platforms of communication and information, 
reducing risks for potential migrants even more. They mentioned how they 
were important from the decision making process to labour insertion, housing, 
legal help and so on. 
Unsurprisingly, migrant networks have a quite local geographical pattern. In 
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the Brazilian case, both authors mention General Valadares, in Minas Gerais, 
a city with a strong tradition of emigration, mainly to the United States. With 
the reorientation of the routes after the restrictive policies following the 9/11 
terrorist attack, these networks re-adapted themselves to new destinations. In 
fact, an interviewee in Filipa Pinho’s work even mentioned that he had not 
known an immigrant in Portugal, but he took the example of other migrants in 
the US. This reinforcing pattern of emigration in the sending country shows 
that migration, even when not specifically to the same destination, still 
perpetuates this movement through cultural and local changes. 
However, it is important to highlight that these networks not only involve 
family, friends and acquaintances, but also private agencies, such as travel 
agencies and creditors. This intricate array of private and public connections 
with Portugal was also pointed out as one of the main important factors for 
interviewers in the work of Beatriz Padilla (2006: 57): 
 
“Another interesting aspect to consider, in relation to the function of 
immigrant networks, is the role of travel agents. In interviews, we noticed 
how they plan an important role, especially through customer tips for the 
tourist as a consumer, which suggests that these agencies know the 
intention of travelling to become an immigrant. These tips goes from not 
going directly to Portugal, wear a type of clothing that does not raise 
suspicion, not take family pictures with them or clothes that indicate a 
longer stay and light luggage, to recommendations on how to react and 
what to say if you have an interview with the immigration agents. Some 
agencies also provide suggestions and provide data such as addresses 
and contacts in Portugal.” 
 
Hence, networks can organize themselves in ways to override State 
regulations and perpetuate migration. Yet, this sort of assistance to irregular 
immigration is quite amateur, and migrants normally use both personal ties 
and private ones. The most common route is to use both a link with another 
Brazilian migrant at the receiving end, and private intermediaries in Brazil to 
buy tickets, gather more information about border control and such.  (Peixoto 
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et al apud Pinho, 2012: 231). 
Another work from the ICMPD organized by Finotelli et al (2013), which 
studied Brazilian migration to Europe, more specifically to Portugal and Spain, 
has some similar findings. Through interviews with Brazilians that have 
returned from Spain and Portugal to the country, along with reports from 
researches conducted with Brazilian migrants in these two countries, the 
existence of migrant networks were highlighted as a main factor in the 
decision (Finotelli et al, 2013: 19). Similar to the findings of Filipa Pinho (2012) 
mentioned above, this research concluded that they do not normally have 
official information on the receiving country and most of their knowledge 
comes from their network.  In one of the focal groups, it was mentioned that 
the support from migrant networks was crucial by almost all of the migrants:  
 
“Almost all said they received prior instructions from their social networks 
about possible questions and the answers given to be given. All agree that 
despite the instructions on arrival, had very little information about what 
they would find at your destination. 
In Goiás, it became clear that the social network of women who are 
already married in Europe with European stimulates the migration of 
Brazilian women with this alternative already in mind, or at least open to 
this alternative as if creating an informal network that would favor these 
unions. 
Social networks not only provide instructions on arrival and the entry 
process, but also provide initial support for integration into the labor 
market. All interviewed individually or through focus groups reported 
receiving some support from acquaintances or relatives at the destination, 
both for access to work, and for the first housing alternatives.” (Finotelli et 
al, 2013: 31) 
 
Once more, networks are ranked as more decisive than official sources of 
information for potential migrants. Another aspect that we would like to 
highlight is the existence of migrants associations in Portugal, which can also 
be used as a support system once the migrant is here. Unlike networks, they 
are more general and not based on kinship, assuming the form of a 
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community reference for the migrant. The first Brazilian migrants association 
dates back to 1992, Casa do Brasil em Lisboa, and is quite well-organized 
politically. It was involved in the talks that guaranteed the extraordinary 
regularization process in 2003, ‘Acordo Lula’, and it has itself studied the 
migration phenomena in Portugal, publishing their works. Today, there are 
four associations recognized as official representatives of the Brazilian 
community under the law 115/1999, 3rd August18. There is also one that is 
listed by ACIDI as a Brazilian migrants association but not under the law 
provisions19, and another one listed by the Brazilian Consulate in Lisbon20.  
Conversely, if push-pull factors, together with networks, are the necessary 
conditions for migration to occur, the granting of some set of rights to 
foreigners is the sufficient condition (Hollifield et al, 2014: 15). These rights 
most often derive from domestic sources of law, but are also increasingly 
protected by international law and human rights convention, and in the case of 
Portugal, the European Union legislation on the matter. Thus, we turn now to 
our third variable in the liberal state thesis, a rights-based constitutionalism.  
 
3.3 Citizenship and Right 
	  
	  
Besides push-pull factors and the influence of networks, immigration is fuelled 
by the rise of a new rights-based politics in democracies, a scenario that is 
itself both a cause and a consequence of political struggles that have 
generated new definitions of citizenship and membership in liberal societies 
(Hollifield, 1992: 169). Citizenship is a powerful instrument for the nation state, 
dividing it between insiders and outsiders, nationals and foreigners. According 
to Jacobson (1996: 7), citizenship fulfils two principal tasks. First, it 
determines the criteria of membership, deciding who may and who may not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Casa do Brasil de Lisboa, Associação Brasileira de Portugal, Associação Mais Brasil, 
Casa Grande Associação Luso-Brasileira de Solidariedade e Promoção Social. 
 
19 Associação dos Amigos Brasileiros na Madeira. 
 




belong to or join the ‘people’. Second, it determines the nature of the 
‘conversation’ between the individual and the state, citizens’ rights and 
obligations, the kind of access the citizen has to the state, and which kinds of 
demands the state can make upon the citizen. 
Citizenship, hence, has been of great importance to the modern nation state, 
but not as a rigid concept. Rather, it has been transforming itself since then 
and broadening its own boundaries to surpass old and unreasonable 
prejudices. It is itself a result of political struggles that generated each 
definition of citizenship in democracies that we have today. Yet, the increase 
of movement across borders has once more posed questions to the definition 
of citizenship and is forcing states into addressing them. In Europe, the post-
war migration experience has launched a trend toward the de-ethnicization of 
citizenship, as Joppke and Morawska (2003: 18) put it. 
This means that citizenship in Europe has started to be more closely linked by 
ius solis and constituted by political values rather than by ethnicity. They 
argue that this has important long-term implications for the self-understanding 
of nationhood, to the degree that mere birth constitutes citizenry and can no 
longer be conceived in ethnic terms. The increasing tolerance of dual 
citizenships in Europe would be, then, a consequence of these changes. 
Portugal is inserted in this political context and has experienced a positive 
liberalisation of its policies. There has been substantial legal activity in the 
Iberian country, concerning the entrance, departure, and permanence of 
foreigners is an indicator of how the intensity of migration flows has 
challenged convictions about nationality (Machado, 2004: 313). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the friendly relationship between Brazil 
and Portugal has granted rights-privilege to their nationals through bilateral 
agreements. The ‘Statute of Equality’ grants equal rights and obligations for 
Brazilians in Portugal and Portuguese in Brazil, without changing any aspect 
of their nationalities. In fact, once they are naturalized they are no longer 
under this treaty. As Castles and Davidson (2000: 85) sustain, citizenship is 
not always an either/or situation since, in response to large-scale settlement, 
countries confer forms of quasi-citizenship that confer some but not all rights 
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of citizenship.  
In liberal democracies, migrants pose an old challenge under the glow of a 
new light: representation. Migrants are normally not enfranchised in liberal 
democracies, not until they are naturalized. There is a democratic deficit as 
the result of the fact that migrants cannot, hypothetically, sign the ‘social 
contract’ for the functioning of democracy (Healy, 2011: 29). Liberal 
democracies are quite illiberal with migrants living in their territories. Hence, 
becoming a citizen remains of crucial importance to a migrant and we will 
focus on the legislative changes in Portugal that have dealt with this decisive 
right – a decisive challenge to democracy. 
After the Carnation Revolution and the decolonisation, the immediate question 
was: who is still Portuguese and who is not? The fears of the possible 
migration based on previous ius solis definitions of citizenship fostered quite a 
restrictive piece of legislation in 1975. Its objective was to allow the white 
population in the former colonies to be repatriated, but as it could not be done 
in terms of racial colour, another exit was found: ius sanguinis (Pires, 2003: 
127). It was only in 1981 that other legislative provisions were made, mostly 
considering the needs of Portuguese emigrants. These secured the nationality 
of Portuguese children even if their parents’ domicile was no longer in 
Portugal, but also admitted that foreigners’ children who were born in Portugal 
could seek naturalization if their parents had been living in the country for 
longer than 6 years. 
This restrictive strategy echoes into the dispositions of the decree 25/94, 
signed in 20th October 1994. Here, a positive discrimination towards 
Portuguese speaking countries is enforced and the six year time provision still 
remains in order to ask for their children's naturalization. But for other 
migrants, it is necessary to reside for at least ten years. In both cases, a new 
condition is added: at least one of the parents must be regularly living in the 
country. Hence, irregular migrants would leave this inheritance to their 
children, a difficult problem to fix in the eyes of this new legislation.  
The differentiation between Lusophones and other foreigners was not as 
disruptive as it could be, because the majority of the migrants in the decade 
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were from Portuguese speaking countries. According to Pires (2003: 130), the 
logic behind this is to prevent new migratory flows from other nationalities, in 
an assimilationist approach. Naturalization by marriage is also now more 
restrictive, as three years of marriage and a strong connection to Portugal, a 
quite subjective feature, are obligatory in the process. Thus, this decree 
represents reinforcement of the ius sanguinis principle. 
Yet, in the nineties, a more liberal trend started to appear, due to the growing 
influence of democratic values, the stabilization of borders and a more mature 
view on migration. It was recognized that there is an incompatibility between 
democratic norms and values versus restrictions on access to nationality, as 
well as negative effects on social integration (Pires, 2003: 131). It was finally 
understood that migrants would settle in Portugal, and that second and third 
generations would deal with even bigger challenges, as Joppke and 
Morawska (2003: 26-27) explains: 
“(…) The denial of citizenship to immigrants and, in the countries whose 
citizenship laws and policies are informed by jus sanguinis, their native-
born children sustains their identification with their home countries and 
constrains, or channels into an oppositional trajectory, their incorporation 
into the host society. Conversely, the acceptance or, as is more often the 
case, tacit tolerance of dual citizenship by the receiver state encourages 
immigrants or ethnics to engage in bi-national practices, contributing 
simultaneously to their attachment over time to the host society and to the 
preservation of transnational commitments.” 
 Therefore, liberalization was understood as better means for 
integration and there were changes in the political scenario in regards to 
migration that culminated in the creation of the High Commissariat on 
Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) in 1996. Through their projects 
targeted at integration, legal help and even academic research, migration 
gained a new light. Three years later, a law on migrants association linked 
both the ACIME and migrants organizations, permitting a more 
comprehensive approach from the state’s perspective and better political 
participation for migrants. 
This more progressive political scenario allowed important changes in the 
following years that would culminate in a revision of the nationality law in 
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2006. In 1998, family reunification was seen as a right through the decree 
244/98. In 2001, a possibility for irregular migrants who could prove that they 
were working in Portugal through the creation of an ‘authorization of 
permanence’21 . In 2004, two other changes were made to further ensure the 
possibility of reacquiring Portuguese nationality22 . This intense legislative 
activity shows how urgent it was to make a deeper change and redefine the 
relationship between migration and citizenship in more liberal terms.  
Then, on The 17th of April of 2006, the Republic Assembly without a single 
opposing vote approved the Lei da Nacionalidade23. The first striking change 
is the recognition of a status of citizenship to those who have strong ties to 
Portugal. The principle of ius soli is incorporated, providing a more 
encompassing alternative for migrants. This new nationality law also had a 
transnational side, as one of its objectives was to incorporate provisions from 
the European Convention of Nationality ratified by the country. Specifically in 
terms of anti-discrimination in terms of nationality and the possibility to acquire 
nationality for those who were born or are regular residents in the country 
(Healy, 2011: 65). So, the differentiation between lusophones and other 
migrants had to be removed. Now, every migrant has the same rights and 
faces the same requirements to become a citizen. 
For children who were born in Portugal, the requirements are: if at least one of 
the parents has been regularly living in the country for the last five years; if the 
child has studied the whole first cycle of schooling in Portugal; if one of the 
parents were also born in Portugal, regardless of nationality; if the parents, 
although irregular, have been living in the country for the last ten years. For 
migrants who were born outside Portugal, the requirements are: have been 
living in Portugal regularly in the last six years, prove a basic knowledge of the 
Portuguese language and have not been convicted of crimes with sentences 
superior than three years. 
The most positive aspects are the greater possibility for children of first and 
second-generation migrants to acquire nationality, even if their parents are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Decree Law n.º 4/2001 10 January, 2001.	  
22	  Law n.º 1/2004 de 15 Januart, 2004.	  
23	  Law n.º 2/2006 de 17 April, 2006.	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regular, and the exclusion of the means of subsistence requirement present in 
the previous nationality law. To be a citizen of this liberal state no longer 
connotes membership in a particular cultural or ethnic community, and it can 
no longer require the subjective proof of ‘connection with the Portuguese 
community’. Language here remains as a basic requirement that they are 
asked to share.  
Yet, the discrimination still resides when their application for citizenship 
cannot be considered if they have previously been convicted of a crime with a 
sentence of over three years. Since no Portuguese citizen can lose her or his 
citizenship regardless of the crime, this should not be the case for a foreigner. 
Although it may be necessary for legitimacy of the measure in front of the 
Portuguese society and political parties, it is important to have in mind that it 
is still discrimination and should be re-evaluated in the future. In all European 
Union countries, including Portugal, the migrant’s criminal record is required 
(Healy, 2011: 74). In all EU15, it is also established that the migrant cannot 
constitute a threat to the state’s integrity. Portugal, however, does not have 
such provision, possibly because it does not seem to share the same fear 
about security and the perception of integration failure that exists in many 
countries of Western Europe (Healy, 2011: 74-75). Political parties generally 
tend not to use migration for political purposes (Healy, 2011: 74-75), which 
stands in the contrast with the general trend in the age of globalization. 
In 2007, with the MIPEX II, Portugal was ranked the second best country in 
integrating its migrants 24 . Among 28 countries and only surpassed by 
Sweden, the country’s legal framework on integration is distinguished. Within 
MIPEX criteria, Portugal is ranked second in access to the labour access, 
family reunion, and anti-discrimination. Its policies on long-term residence 
ranked fourth in the EU-25 and access to nationality policies rank third. All of 
the criteria were better evaluated in comparison with the 2005 MIPEX. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  MIPEX is the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which today lists 38 countries through 167 




But it was in 2011 that even higher scores were reached. Portugal was still 
ranked 2nd best country in integration policies, although it was, by that time, 
among 31 countries. The immigration law, altered in 2007, was also 
highlighted as it improved the rights and conditions for long-term residence 
fairly, along with improvements in the service provided for migrants 25 . 
Furthermore, family reunification was also pointed out as an area that had 
improved. Labour-market integration remained as its best feature, also with an 
improvement. The adjustment in 2009 to subsistence requirements for 
migrants in face of the economic crisis also deserves to be mentioned, as this 
moment of turmoil was not used as an excuse for restrictive policies. 
The 2015 MIPEX, with 38 countries in comparison, sees Portugal holding onto 
its 2nd place26 . The changes in context, such as the persistence of the 
economic crisis and a right-wing coalition party since 2012, were said to be of 
little influence in integration policies. It stresses that the highly positive attitude 
towards migrants continued during the economic crisis, with no extreme right 
party in national elections. The fact that the country is no longer a country of 
immigration, but has returned to its emigration tradition because of the crisis, 
has not yet changed positive policies on integration. The access to nationality 
was even higher ranked than in the previous MIPEX, along with political 
participation and anti-discrimination. However, labour-market integration and 
long-term residence had seen a slight decrease.  
Fortunately, Portugal changed its shift in the nineties and is now in a much 
more comfortable relationship with its migrants. Not only through access to 
nationality, but also granting rights for migrants who are not yet entitled or 
have not yet decided to naturalize themselves. This liberal rights regime 
shows the strength of democracy in the country, with the recognition of the 
incompatibility between democratic norms and values and the restrictions on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Claire Hailey (2011) points out that since 2006 there was a decrease in the waiting time for 
appointments with SEF, for example, a result of the ‘debureaucratisation’ envisioned by the 
government. But it is still one of the complaints for many migrants interviewed.  
26	  Although the final ranking was not released until the end of this work, Portugal’s country 




access to nationality (Pires; Pinho apud Healy, 2011: 65). The protection 
given to foreigners in rights-based regimes, taken together with push-pull 
factors and the strength of migrant networks, can together explain the 






“It is not the right of a guest that the stranger has a claim to (which would 
require a special, charitable contract stipulating that he be made a 
member of the household for a certain period of time), but rather a right to 
visit, to which all human beings have a claim, to present oneself to society 
by virtue of the right of common possession of the surface of the earth.” 
 
Kant in Perpetual Peace on the Third Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace: 
Cosmopolitan Right.  
 
The striking asymmetry of the liberal world in which  ‘everyone has the right to 
leave any country, including its own’, as founded in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, yet in which no one has the right to enter any country is one 
of the main dilemmas within the international liberal community (Zolberg, 
2008: 454. This tension between individuals and societies at each end of a 
migrant's trajectory was nowhere solved. The right to visit, to which all human 
beings should have a claim, might not be conquered for another century. Yet, 
this should not be seen as a pessimistic prevision, but as an idyllic goal to 
further our understanding of migration. Neither dreamer transnationalism nor 
sceptic realism when facing reality, but having both in sight to keep our ideals 
and understand our difficulties. That is our main conclusion from studying 
Brazilian migration to Portugal in the recent history, on a more subjective 
note.  
Our choice to primarily use the liberal state thesis, although with some 
convergences with other theorizations, was triggered mainly by the claim that 
a rights-based constitutionalism is important to migration. Even if none of the 
Brazilians interviewed in the works of Padilla (2006), Pinho (2012) and 
Finotelli et al (2013) have mentioned it as a factor of attraction, they have 
mentioned it as a cause of stay. We should not expect it to be put in these 
terms, but it comes with the mention of the importance of entering Portugal, 
being a regular migrant, having rights (and obligations) that are the same a 
Portuguese citizen, and acquiring citizenship.  
There were two main transitions discussed in our work: the migration 
transition that changed both Portugal’s and Brazil’s migration patterns and 
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crossed their paths once more, and the transition of Portuguese legislative 
attitude towards migration towards a more liberal understanding. When 
Portugal became a country of immigration, it took some time for the country to 
understand itself as such, since it has a long history of emigration – from 
colonization until today. With an inadequate response, restrictiveness 
appeared to be the answer until the nineties. But, with the undeniable 
persistence of this change, with immigration surpassing emigration year after 
year in this decade, our second important transition begins.  
Between 1993 and 2010 the net migration rate was positive (INE, several 
years), a moment of learning for a country so relatively new to immigration, 
which culminated in the progressive measures taken in the last two decades. 
During that period, pull factors were extremely attractive. The country was 
integrating itself in what would become the European Union and the 
forthcoming investment guaranteed prosperous years. Most of the migrants 
communities of today started to be consolidated in the eighties, which is the 
case of that of Brazilian migrants. Networks, then, started to show their signs 
of vitality and their reinforcing pattern became clear. With these two variables 
working at full force, the number of Brazilians in Portugal surpassed other 
nationalities to become the biggest community as of 2007 and reached its 
peak in terms of total amount of migrants in 2010. 
The answers in terms of rights were given on two fronts: through bilateral 
agreements and legislative activity. Through the Tratado da Amizade and its 
consequential Estatuto de Igualdade, a major step was reached for Brazilians 
in Portugal. It was a moment where the Brazilian government decided to take 
a closer look at its diaspora and represent the needs of its nationals outside of 
its borders. We are not so naïve as to think that the interest behind it was only 
in terms of guarantees of rights, as both countries saw in each a potential for 
market gains and access to another regional market, Mercosul and European 
Union. 
Migration and trade are connected by many ends, two of which are 
particularly important to understand the need for this agreement: it is through 
the market demand for foreign workers that migrants are pulled towards other 
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countries, and it is through channels open for trade that a movement of 
people to and from the same destinations can start. These two mechanisms 
were at work in Portugal, trying to reinforce its market relations, both countries 
resolved upon expanding other agreements. Migration, therefore, was one of 
the connections between them that were growing at fast speed and, which 
required special attention.  
Alongside with the Portuguese legislation which conferred a more privileged 
set of rights to Lusophone countries, the Estatuto da Igualdade concedes far 
more rights to Brazilians and puts them into a special condition, one step 
closer to citizenship. It is, thus, another proof that the citizenship policy of a 
state is never disconnected from its immigration policy (Silva apud Healy, 
2011: 34). Furthermore, it also shows how the type of relationship between 
the countries from which one emigrates and those who take them in have a 
strong influence on the conduct of the receiving state towards these people 
(Machado, 2004: 316). As a whole range of civil and social rights are granted 
to Brazilian migrants through this Statute, without conveying citizenship itself, 
it remained as a goal for many migrants. 
Becoming a citizen has strong implications for a migrant, as it means no 
longer being a migrant. Once you are naturalized, your rights and obligations 
are the same as those of a national, your documents are the same as those of 
a national, and the colour of your passport is the same as one of a national, 
which means that your right to be in a country is no longer something you 
have to fight for or renew annually. Being a citizen not only sorts out these 
sorts of formalities, but also has a deep impact in the feeling of integration in 
the receiving country. Thus, the new nationality law passed in 2006 is a 
positive victory for migrants’ rights. It no longer discriminates Lusophones 
from other foreigners, not by making it harder for both of them, rather by 
enlarging the set of rights for all migrants.  
Notwithstanding, with the legislative change in 2007 aimed at migrants from 
short stays and long-term residence, there was a further step towards 
liberalization of Portugal’s policies on migration. This granted more security in 
terms of rights and facilitated the process of acquiring visas. Rights, then, 
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were addressed fairly both for migrants who were willing to become nationals 
after their long relationship with the country, and for those who were here for 
shorter periods. This was important for the increasing number of Brazilians 
who have decided to undertake educational courses here, either through 
academic exchange or for bachelor and post-graduation courses. This change 
could be witnessed on the increasing number of visas for educational 
purposes emitted in the last years. 
This second transition, towards a more liberal standpoint on migration 
policies, is reflected not only within borders but also internationally, with 
MIPEX ranking Portugal as the 2nd best country in integration policies since 
2007. This latecomer to migration has overcome the initial restrictiveness and 
now ranks higher than traditional countries of immigration, such as Canada 
and The United States. Within Europe’s anti-immigration scenario, it is 
praiseworthy that the 2015 saw the country maintain its place as one of the 
best policy-makers for integration. This, however, does not mean that there is 
no room for improvement, especially in education, health, political 
participation and permanent residence.  
Conversely, the challenge still remains to effectively put its rights-based 
constitutionalism into practice. There has been a slight improvement in 
services for migrants, but they still involve complex bureaucracy, which may 
involve documents that need to be requested in the country of origin, the 
waiting for an appointment with SEF, and so on. Organisations such as SOS 
Racismo have also highlighted how sceptical they are when confronted with 
the MIPEX ranking, and list many episodes of discrimination towards 
migrants27. We cannot neglect that, for many migrants this index would never 
be perceived as such, since they struggle to be integrated into the labour 
market with, normally, downward mobility, who feel discriminated when they 
are looking for houses, and have difficulties fulfil some of the requirements for 
visas and are bounded to be irregular.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Imigração não foi tão politizada como a emigração, Público, Available at:
<<http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/imigracao-nao-foi-politizada-como-a-emigracao-
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Hence, there is the need to continuously improve legislation, together with 
effectiveness. Yet, with a more consolidated rights-based constitutionalism in 
Portugal, and the networks, which have already been decisive for other 
migrants in the past, the economic variable is the one that lies dormant for the 
time being. It has changed some personal trajectories for Brazilians who saw 
themselves compelled to go back home, when a more favourable scenario 
started in the 2000s. 
Yet, at the time of writing this work, there is considerable uncertainty over the 
future of the Brazilian economy, with an economic and political crisis having 
erupted in 2015. After a year of slow growth, political scandals involving many 
politicians and big companies – public and private – changed the course of 
the recently re-elected presidency and put a spell on the country’s economy28. 
Brazil is now entering a moment of crisis, while Portugal is showing its first 
salient signs of a recovery. Does this mean that push-pull factors might once 
more become an important variable for Brazilians considering crossing the 
Atlantic? Will Portugal be one of their destinations? We cannot answer 
precisely, but we can assume that those networks are in force, and the 
strength of a rights-based constitutionalism is now also established. If 
attraction factors turn Portugal once more into a tempting country for Brazilian 
migrants, the years to come may bear witness to a new wave of migration. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Watts, J. (2015). Brazil in crisis mode as ruling party sees public trust rapidly dissolving. 
The Guardian.  
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